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SUMMARY
Signal detection plays a critical role in realizing reliable transmission through commu-
nication systems. With good detectors, transmission reliability can be enhanced. Maxi-
mum a posteriori (MAP) detector is taken as the optimal detector, which gives the detec-
tion result with maximum a posteriori value. Maximum-likelihood detector (MLD) and
zero-forcing detector (ZFD) are the two classical detection schemes. MLD implements
the statical method, maximum-likelihood estimation, to select the signal(information) with
maximum-likelihood value. ZFD inverts the frequency response of the channel. But for
some particular communication systems, both MAP and ML detection usually require high
computation complexity, and sometime MAP and ML detection are even not applicable.
This thesis first develops a novel and practical detection algorithm for two-dimensional
(2-D) M-ary inter-symbol interferences(ISI) channel where MAP and MLD cannot be
realized. Next, the thesis analyzes the fundamental performance of MLD and ZFD in
multiple-input multiple-output(MIMO) systems from information theoretic point of view.
The security code design to achieve physical layer communication security and reliability
over wiretap channel is also studied.
Our work starts from developing a coding and detection algorithm for localized holo-
graphic data storage system. To deal with this problem, we model the whole storage sys-
tem as a communication system with 2-D ISI channel and M-ary inputs. Since there is
no existing efficient detection algorithm to detect the M-ary signals over 2-D ISI channel,
we propose to implementing multi-level coding technology and detect the signal stage by
stage. On each stage, to reduce the computation complexity,multi-strip BCJR with Gaus-
sian approximation equalization algorithm is developed. The proposed equalization algo-
rithm can hugely reduce the number of states for BCJR algorithm on each single data of the
whole 2-D data page, which significantly reduces the computation complexity and makes
the proposed equalization algorithm applicable. With the proposed detection scheme, we
viii
also compute the achievable information rate on each level.More over, the corresponding
low-density parity-check(LDPC) component code is designed accordingly to achieve the
achievable information rate with the proposed detection algorithm.
To numerically analyze the performance of ML and ZF detection echnologies in a
MIMO system, themutual information(MI) is widely used as a metric. Existing results on
fundamental limits of MIMO systems with ML or ZF detection are focused on the assump-
tion of continuous signals at the receiver side and the eff ct of detectors has largely not
been addressed. However, in practical digital communication systems, when the inputs are
discrete, the continuous outputs given by the receivers have to be mapped to the alphabet
of the transmitted signals,i.e. the final outputs should also have discrete values. In this
dissertation we study the mutual information between the transmitted discrete signal and
the quantized estimated signal given by maximum-likelihood r zero-forcing detector in a
MIMO channel setting. To differentiate this from case of the mutual information without
any assumption on the detector, we establish a new metric which is thepost-detection mu-
tual information(PMI). When phase-shift keying (PSK) constellations are adopted, easily
computable asymptotically tight low bounds of the PMI with MLD or ZFD are derived.
Furthermore, when quadrature amplitude modulation (QAM) constellations are adopted, a
numerically closed form of the PMI with ZFD is provided. We show how much the mutual
information is reduced by the presence of quantization of the detectors. The lower bounds
provided in the dissertation tightly approach the simulation results in mid and high SNR
region.
For the security problem in wiretap channel, we consider a comm nly adopted wiretap
model which has a noiseless main channel and a binary erasureeavesdropper’s channel.
LDPC codes have been applied to achieve strong secrecy over such wiretap channel set-
ting. However, it lacks design flexibility balancing on security and reliability, and cannot
illustrate the fundamental tradeoffs among erasure rate, secrecy rate, and the security per-
formance. We investigate ar ndom complex field code(RCFC) design for such wiretap
ix
channels. The design of RCFCs is systematic and flexible for any code rate. Our analysis
shows that RCFC can achieve the secrecy capacity as the code length goes to infinity. More
strikingly, the presented design is the first one which provides a platform to tradeoff secrecy





A communication system can be roughly decomposed of transmitters, communication
channel, and detectors. The function of the detector is to rec ver the transmitted sig-
nal(information) based on the received signal(information). Detection is one of the key
components of various communication systems. From wireless communication to data
storage system, detection plays a critical role. Different communication systems have dif-
ferent requirements on detection. For example, in data storge system, the detection scheme
should minimize the detection error rates. However, in wireless communication system,
because of the existence of security issue, the detection scheme design at the legitimate
receiver pursues to achieve arbitrary small error rate, while at the same time, the whole
system should maximize the detection errors of the eavesdroppe s’ detection.
How to design detection scheme has become a hot research topiin communication
research field. Maximum a posteriori (MAP) detector [1–3] is taken as the optimal detec-
tor, which gives the detection result with maximum a posteriori value. However, MAP
detection usually requires high computation complexity, and sometime MAP detection
is even not applicable. Maximum-likelihood detector (MLD)[4–6] and zero-forcing de-
tector (ZFD) [7] are the two classical detection schemes. MLD implements the s atical
method, maximum-likelihood estimation, to select the signal(i formation) with maximum-
likelihood value. ZFD inverts the frequency response of thec annel. However, how to de-
sign the detection scheme with ”good” performance and tolerant computation complexity
for some particular communication systems is still a hard problem. One of such examples
is holographic data storage system, which is one of next-generation storage techniques.
The communication channel of holographic data storage system can be modeled as atwo-
dimensional(2-D) intersymbol-interference(ISI) channel. If using MLD, unacceptable
1
computation complexity is required. While ZFD incurs largeerror detection rate. To detect
the stored data information in holographic data storage system, a novel and computation
efficient detection scheme needs to be investigated. Meanwhile, the performance of the de-
signed detection scheme should be quantified. Furthermore,the corresponding coding and
decoding scheme needs to be developed to implement holographic data storage system.
Even for the classical and popular detection schemes like MLD and ZFD, what the
limits of these detection schemes are from information theoretic point of view is still an
unanswered question. One example is amulti-input multi-output(MIMO) system with a
maximum-likelihood detector(MLD) or zero-forcing detector(ZFD). By taking advantage
of the spatial diversity in wireless communications or datastorage systems, multi-input
and multi-output (MIMO) systems (which also represent multi-transmitter multi-receiver
systems) offer significant improvement on reliable data rates compared with single-input
single-output (SISO) systems [8–11]. One of the important parameters to quantify the per-
formance of MIMO systems is mutual information (MI). To maximize MI, there are two
categories of methodologies. The first category assumes channel feedback, partial feed-
back or finite rate feedback is somehow known at the transmitter. Under such assumptions,
optimality of beamforming is deeply studied to maximize theMI of MIMO channels (see
e.g.[12–19]). The second category assumes no channel state information at the transmitter.
Under such an assumption, it is not possible to apply beamforming technology at the trans-
mitter. Instead, continuous inputs signal without beamforing is used. At the receiver side,
zero-forcing (ZF) [20–22] and maximum-likelihood (ML) [23–25] receivers are commonly
adopted because they represent the extremes of the receivers in fo ms of performance and
complexity [26,27]. Some related previous work has been done under such assumptions.
Specifically, Ma and Zhang provide the MI between the continuous transmitted signals and
the continuous received signals given by ML or ZF receiver [28]. Furthermore, the underly-
ing factor which determines the difference of MI with the two receivers is proven to be the
orthogonal deficiency (od) of the channel matrix [28]. Most of the methods referred above
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deal with continuous signals at both the transmitter and therec iver. Actually, when there
is no channel information known at the transmitter, the discrete independent and identically
distributed (i.i.d.) input symbols are of more interest from both the theoretical and practical
point of view. Obviously, the discrete input signals will reduce the MI compared with the
MI with continuous input signals. Some research work discused the MI with discrete input
signals. In the related work [29,30], the MI between the discrete transmitted signal and the
continuous received signal (no quantization) given by ML orZF receiver is discussed.
It should be noted that both ML and ZF receivers considered inthe existing refer-
ences [20–24,28,29] produce continuous values. In other words, the MI discussed in the
previous work is the one between the inputs and continuous outputs given by ML or ZF
receiver. However, in practical digital communication systems, when the inputs are dis-
crete the continuous outputs given by the receivers have to bmapped to the alphabet of
the transmitted signals,i.e. the final outputs should also have discrete values. We refer to
the ML (ZF) receiver with the hard mapping step as the ML (ZF) detector and call the hard
outputs given by detectors as the detected signals. The harddetection step has not been
considered before in the related work. Thus, we ask an important yet unanswered question:
what is the maximum information rate that can be transmittedreliably in MIMO systems
when both detectors and discrete inputs are considered?
Before answering the question, let us first explore the meaning of the question. Con-
sider a widely used MIMO system with receivers and error-control coding. The ML or
ZF receiver computes the log-likelihood ratio (LLR) of eachbit of the transmitted symbols
based on the raw resulting outputs and the channel response.The LLRs are transferred to
the decoder as the priori information for decoding. Next thedecoders compute the LLR
of each bit based on the priori information provided by the receiver. Finally the hard de-
coded bits are determined via the LLR given by the decoders. When we design the error
control codes, we need to ask what the code rates are we shoulduse to design the codes.
Obviously, the highest code rates should be the ultimate achievable information rates of
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the systems. From Shannon’s theorem we know that the ultimate achievable information
rates of a communication system should be the MI between the inputs and outputs of that
system without code gains. For MIMO systems with ML or ZF receiver, since the final
hard decoding step of the decoder should be taken into account, the ultimate achievable
code rates of the system are not the MI between the discrete inputs and the continuous
outputs given by the receivers any more [29]. Instead, the ultimate achievable code rates
of the MIMO systems with ML or ZF receiver should be equivalent to the MI between the
discrete inputs and the discrete outputs of the MIMO systemswith ML detector (MLD) or
ZF detector (ZFD), respectively. It will be shown that the answer to the question raised here
is the answer to what highest code rates can be applied in MIMOsystems with a receiver.
Part research work of the thesis focuses on the MI of the discrete MIMO channels with two
widely adopted detectors: MLD and ZFD, which represent the extremes of the detectors
in terms of performance and complexity. To differentiate from the MI without the hard
mapping step, we refer to the one with hard mapping aspost-detection mutual information
(PMI). Since the hard mapping step in the detector is irreversible, we expect that the PMI is
reduced compared to the MI without hard mapping. Fundamental research work is desired
to carry out to find out the value of PMIs.
Another detection problem discussed in the dissertation isthe security code design
in communication system. More specifically, the dissertation investigates a new coding
scheme for wiretap channel [31]. Wiretap channel has caught a lot of attention recently
in secured communications. A commonly adopted wiretap model is that the main channel
is noiseless and the eavesdropper’s channel is binary erasur channel (BEC). LDPC codes
have been applied to achieve strong secrecy [32]. However, it lacks design flexibility bal-
ancing on security and reliability, and cannot illustrate th fundamental tradeoffs among
erasure rate, secrecy rate, and the security performance. Amore flexible and easy designed
security code is highly required to be investigated.
4
1.2 Our Approaches and Thesis Outline
The major goal of this research is to investigate novel signal detection and coding algo-
rithms to improve the performance of a communication system. In particular, we con-
sider three communication systems. The first one islocalized holographic data storage
(LHDS) system. The second one ismultiple-input multiple-output(MIMO) system with
a maximum-likelihood detector(MLD) or zero-forcing detector(ZFD). The last one is the
security problem in wiretap channel.
For LHDS system, we model the channel of the system as a 2-D ISIchannel with M-
ary inputs, which is a more general communication channel. Wadopt multi-level coding
and multi-stage decoding techniques to encode the inputs and decode the outputs, respec-
tively. However, there is no existing algorithms to equalize M-ary 2-D ISI channel. To
efficiently detect the recorded information, we propose Gaussin-approximated multi-stage
multi-strip BCJR equalization algorithm, which equalizesthe channel stage by stage. To
begin with the stage with the highest signal power level, theBCJR algorithm is used to
equalize each level by averaging the interference of the undcoded levels. Both the hard
and soft decisions are passed to the next stages. The detection s heme hugely reduces the
complexity of full-branch BCJR on the entire received page of data and makes the detec-
tion algorithm applicable. To design the corresponding encoding scheme for the system,
the achievable information rate achieved by the proposed equalization algorithm is calcu-
lated level by level via Monte Carlo simulation. Then based on the achievable information
rate on each level, the corresponding semi-algebraic LDPC component code is designed.
The overall performance of the coding and decoding algorithm s examined by the decoding
error rate.
To find out the end-to-end mutual information between the discrete inputs and dis-
crete outputs in a MIMO system with MLD or ZFD, we propose a newmetric, i.e., post-
detection mutual information(PMI), which describes the ultimate achievable information
rate of MIMO system with MLD or ZFD. We first establish the analytical expression of
5
the PMI with MLD and ZFD. We observe that there is no closed form for the PMI with
MLD or ZFD. However, whenphase-shift keying(PSK) symbols are employed, we present
an asymptotically tight lower bound of the PMI with MLD or ZFD. The lower bounds
are easily computed which allows us to evaluate the ultimateachievable information rates
for MIMO systems with detectors. Furthermore, whenquadrature amplitude modulation
(QAM) symbols are employed, we provide a simple numerical method to compute the
PMI with ZFD which is shown to exactly match the simulation results. Since the hard
mapping step in the detector is irreversible, we expect thatthe PMI is reduced compared to
the MI without hard mapping. The conclusion is confirmed by both the simulation and the
theoretic results. Consequently, the ultimate achievablePMI rates that can be transmitted
through the MIMO channels with MLD or ZFD serve as more practical benchmarks for
transmissions.
Wyner and later Csisz´ar and Körner prove that when the secrecy rate is below the se-
crecy capacity, there should exist channel codes, which cangu rantee both robustness to
transmission errors to the legitimate receiver and a prescribed degree of data confidentiality
for the eavesdropper. Hence the wiretap channel setup can beppli d in wireless commu-
nications to achieve the security in physical layer. A fundamental and well adopted wiretap
channel model is that the main channel is noiseless and the eavesdroppers’ channel is bi-
nary erasure channel (BEC). LDPC codes have been applied to achieve secrecy capacity
of such wiretap channels. However, it lacks design flexibility and cannot illustrate the fun-
damental tradeoffs among the secrecy rate, erasure rate, and the secrecy performance. We
propose a random complex field code (RCFC) design for such wiretap channels [33]. In
RCFC, we have three kinds of sybmbols,i.e., the information symbols, the check symbols,
and the random symbols, all of which are QAM symbols. We mix them together by using
linear complex encoder such that the information symbols can be hidden among the other
symbols. The design of RCFCs is systematic and flexible for any code rate. Our analysis
shows that RCFC can achieve the secrecy capacity as the code length goes to infinity. More
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strikingly, the proposed design is the first one which provides a platform to tradeoff secrecy
performance with the erasure rate of the eavesdropper’s channel nd the secrecy rate.
This dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 introduces concepts and funda-
mental results of the above problems, summarizes the state of th art, and sets the notation
used in subsequent chapters. Our main discussion and results are contained in Chapters
3-5. Specifically, Chapter 3 proposes the coding and equalization for M-ary ISI channel.
Chapter 4 presents the meaning and bounds for the PMI of a MIMOsystem with MLD or
ZFD. Chapter 5 introduces RCFC codes and analyzes its’ performance in wiretap channel.




In this chapter the following fundamental results are summarized:
• Introduction on holographic data storage system, the corresponding system model,
and the existing detection schemes.
• Fundamental results on MLD and ZFD from information theoretic point of view.
• Information theoretic security over wiretap channel
2.1 Holographic Data Storage System
This section introduces the holographic data storage system and its’ system models. More-
over, some related detection schemes are reviewed. As it will be shown, to efficiently detect
the inputs of the system, a new detection algorithm is requird to be developed.
Holographic data storage is an alternative approach for next-g neration memory schemes
that is expected to exceed the fundamental limits of conventional 2-D surface storage tech-
nologies like magnetic hard disk drives, optical disks, andsemiconductor memories. In-
stead of recording the data on the surface, holographic storage stores the information in
three dimensions [34]. As shown in Figure2.1, in a holographic storage system, 2-D pixe-
lated patterns with data page information are imposed by aspatial light modulator(SLM)
and are recorded as holograms. Each data page is later retrieved by reading its associated
hologram, which reconstructs the image of the entire input pattern. The reconstructed im-
age of the stored data page is captured by a camera that is typicall acharge-coupled device
(CCD) camera.
Under the two following assumptions:
1. the center of each input pixel at the SLM is exactly imaged onto the center of its
corresponding pixel at the CCD, and
8
Figure 2.1.Working mechanism of holographic data storage system.
2. the image is confined within the CCD pixel area,
the whole system can be modeled as 2-D communication throughparallel noisy channels,
as shown in Figure2.2(a).
xxx
yyy
(a) No pixel misregistration.
xxx
yyy
(b) With pixel misregistration
Figure 2.2.Images on SLM and CCD
However, to fulfill these assumptions becomes quite challenging when high-density 2-D
patterns are employed. Specifically, when high-density 2-Dpatterns are employed, the un-
limited bandwidth of the optical system and the pixel misregistration in the two dimensions
x andy over the recording data page produced by the magnification err r, misalignment,
and optical distortion bring the interference between pixels, as shown in Figure2.2(b).
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Thus, the intensity of the pixel image on CCD is simultaneously determined by the inten-
sity of the corresponding pixel on SLM, the intensities of its neighbor pixels, and the post-
detected noise. Hence when the pixels of the 2-D input page are ither dark or bright, the
page-oriented data recording and retrieving process is generally modeled as the communi-
cation through a noisy 2-D ISI channel with 2-D pages of binary inputs [35,36]. However,
most recently, some new holographic recording techniques sch aslocalized holographic
(LH) recording are currently being developed very quickly [37]. Compared with the con-
ventional angular multiplexed holographic recording, theLH recording scheme provides
much higher diffraction efficiency for each data page during the readout, which results in
much largersignal-to-noise ratio(SNR) [38]. The excess of the SNR enables M-ary data
coding, i.e., multiple gray levels of the pixel intensity [39]. Compared to the conventional
angular multiplexed holographic recording system, fewer data pages can be recorded in
the LH system, hence M-ary data coding can achieve higher coding gains to compensate
the capacity loss and make the capacity of the LH recording comparable to or potentially
larger than the traditional angular multiplexing holographic recording. The LH recording








h(p, q)x(i − p, j − q) + n(i, j), (2.1)
wherex(i, j) ∈ {−M + 1, − M + 3, · · · ,M − 3, M − 1} is M-ary input andy(i, j) is the
corresponding output.n(i, j) is the post-detected noise, which is assumed to be Gaussian
noise with zero mean and with covarianceσ2In×n. h(p, q) is the discrete channel response
with finite span.Lx andLy represent, respectively, the interference depth of the channel in











When the channel is withone-dimensional(1-D) ISI, theBahl-Cocke-Jelinek-Raviv
(BCJR) algorithm [40] is well proven to be efficient to equalize the channel [41,42]. But,
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when the channel is with 2-D ISI, there is no direct extensionof the BCJR algorithm to
the 2-D case. Moreover, even for a 1-D ISI channel, if the inputs are M-ary, the number
of states of the trellis diagram is increased from 2L to ML (L is the interference length),
which increases the computation complexity significantly.For a 2-D ISI channel with
binary inputs, the iterative multistrip BCJR algorithm is pro osed to be a sub-optimal way
to equalize the channel [43]. By applying the iterative multistrip BCJR algorithm on a
limited region of the whole page, the upper and lower bounds of the symmetric information
rates for 2-D ISI channels with binary inputs are calculated[44]. Unfortunately, when the
inputs are M-ary, the computation of the iterative multistrip BCJR is still too complex to
be affordable. How to efficiently equalize the 2-D ISI channels with M-ary inputs with
affordable complexity is a question not previously answered.
Of particular interest to this disertation is to design an efficient detection algorithm and
coding scheme for a LH data recording system and to evaluate the performance of the
proposed detection from the information theoretic point ofview. As will be shown, by
employing multilevel coding, multistage decoding, and aver ging the interference of the
undecoded levels, the detection algorithm and coding scheme proposed in this dissertation
reduces the complexity of full-branch BCJR and makes the whole design applicable [45].
More generally, the designed detection algorithm can be imple ented to detection for 2-D
ISI channel with M-ary inputs.
2.2 MIMO System with MLD or ZFD
In this section, we first present the general MIMO channel model and give the definitions
for MLD and ZFD considered in the dissertation. Then we review some existing results
and conclusions about the information rates of MIMO channels. Based on these results the
goal of our research is presented.
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2.2.1 System Model of MIMO with MLD or ZFD
We focus on the discrete-time MIMO channel withM transmitters andN receivers. The
transmission over the channel can be described by
y = Hs + ω, (2.3)
wherey is theN × 1 received vector,s is the M × 1 transmitted signal,H is anN × M
complex Gaussian distributed channel matrix, andω is i.i.d. zero-mean complex Gaussian
noise with covariance matrixE[ωωH ] = σ2ωIN. In the following we focus on the case
M = N.
Let sk be thekth element ofs which is drawn from complex QAM or PSK constellation





whereEs = E[|sk|2] andN0 = 2σ2ω.
Note that for different channel models,H has different structures. For quasi-static fad-
ing channels, the entries ofH are modeled as zero mean, circularly symmetric, complex
Gaussian random variables. For data recording channels,H i modeled as a constant ma-
trix, the entries of which represent the channel responses.Thus, the model described in
(2.3) is general enough to represent most linear channels.
We define the detection process including equalization of the received vectory and the
hard mapping of the equalized vector to finite constellation.
2.2.1.1 ZFD description
The structure of ZFD is shown in Fig.2.3. The first step is equalizing the received vectory
which is given as
x = H†y = s + η, (2.5)
whereH† = (HHH)−1HH , x is the equalized vector giveny, andη = H†ω. The covariance
matrix of the equalized noiseη is
W = E[ηηH ] = H†(H†)
H
E[ωωH ] = σ2ω(H
HH)−1. (2.6)
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Figure 2.3.The scheme of ZFD.
As shown in (2.6), the equalization introduces the correlation among the noise entries.
However, in the hard mapping step of the ZFD, the correlations between the noise entries
are not considered. The ZFD mapsx ymbol by symbol. For example, thekth entry ofx
denoted asxk is mapped to the alphabetS as
ŝk = Qs(xk) = arg
s̃k∈S
min‖xk − s̃k‖2, k = 1, · · · ,N, (2.7)
whereQs(·) represents the hard mapping operation of ZFD, ˆsk is thekth detected symbol
of the detected signal ˆsZF given by ZFD.
2.2.2 MLD description
MLD directly maps the received vectory to an M-dimensional spaceSM, which is given as
ŝML = Qv(y) = arg
s̃∈SM
min‖y − Hs̃‖2, (2.8)
whereQv(·) represents the hard mapping operation of MLD and ˆsML is the final detected
signal given by MLD. The hard mapping operation of MLD given in (2.8) is equivalent to
quantizing the equalized vectorx toSM. The equivalent form of (2.8) is:
ŝML = Qv(x) = arg
s̃∈SM
min(x − s̃)H W−1 (x − s̃) , (2.9)
and the structure of the equivalent MLD is shown in Fig.2.4.
Figure 2.4.The scheme of MLD.
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Remark:Qv(·) andQs(·) seem similar to source quantization [46]. For example, MLD
quantizes the signal vector based on the full covariance matrix of the equalized signals,
which can be interpreted as vector quantizer [47, 48]. ZFD quantizes the entries of the
signals one by one without considering the correlations of the entries, and thus can be
interpreted as scalar quantizer [46,49]. However, the detection is not the same as the source
quantization in at least two aspects. The first one is for detectors, the quantization alphabet
is pre-defined. For example, if 4-QAM is used for the transmision, the detected symbols
should also be in 4-QAM constellation. The second one does not consider rate distortion
nor information loss in detection, but deals more on the noise effect. Therefore, the PMI
with MLD or ZFD can not be solved using source quantization theory.
2.2.3 Existing Results and Problem Formulation
In this section, we review some existing results and conclusions about the information rates
of MIMO channels.
Several cases are discussed here. The first one is that the transmitted signal is allowed to
be drawn from a continuous set and the channel matrix is knownat the receiver. Under such
a condition, the maximum MI with ML or ZF receiver can be achieved when the transmitted
signals are complex Gaussian distributed with zero mean. Thus, t e instantaneous MI with



















whereRs is the covariance matrix of the transmitted symbolss and
Rη = diag[W1,1,W2,2, · · ·WM,M], (2.12)
with Wm,m being the (m,m)th entry of the full covariance matrixW given in (2.6). When
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Rs = IM and the SNR is high, the difference betweenCML andCZF is approximated by [28]





whereod(H) is the orthogonal deficiency ofH and is defined by [28]





wherehm is them-th column ofH.
Secondly, when the transmitted signals are discrete,i.e., each symbol is drawn from
a QAM or PSK constellation with equal probability, the instantaneous MI of the MIMO
system with ML receiver is the MI between the discrete transmitted signals and the con-
tinuously equalized signalx given the full covariance matrixW [29,51]
IML(s; x|W) = H(s) − H(s|x,W)






















































































Different from the MI with ML receiver, the MI with ZF receiver is the MI betweens and
x givenRη [29,52]































































































In summary,CML(H) andCZF(H) given in (2.10) and (2.11) are the upper bounds of the
MI of MIMO systems with ML and ZF receivers, respectively. The bounds can be achieved
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only when the inputs are Gaussian continuous signals, whereasIML andIZF given in (2.15)
and (2.17) are the upper bounds of the MI of the MIMO systems with discrete inputs by
employing ML and ZF receivers, respectively. However, whenthe hard mapping step is
adopted in MIMO systems, the achievable information rates become the MI between the
discrete transmitted signals and the discrete detected signal ˆsML in (2.9) or ŝZF in (2.7). The
MI betweens and ŝML (ŝZF) is referred as the PMI with MLD (ZFD) in this dissertation.
The PMI with MLD or ZFD is actually the highest information rates one should apply in
the system when error control codes are employed in the MIMO systems with ML or ZF
receiver, respectively. All other MI rates people derived are just loose upper bounds for
PMI without considering the irreversible hard mapping operation.
2.3 Information-Theoretic Security
Traditionally, the classical cryptographic security, which is referred to ascomputational
security, is established above the physical layer. The computational security is based on
the assumptions of bounded computational power of an eavesdropper, and the unproven
difficulty of some particular one-way functions. For instance, in well-known cryptography
RSA, the security is based on the difficulties in factoring large numbers and takinge-th
roots modulo a composite number. However, if efficient algorithms are developed to solve
the above two problems, the system will become insecure. In contrast with computational
security,information-theoretic securitymodel established on the physical layer, is realized
by exploiting the randomness of communication channels. Different from computational
security protocol, information-theoretic security protocol does not need any computational
restriction on the eavesdropper. Intensive research results have shown that physical layer
security can potentially, significantly strengthen the security of communication systems.
Actually, the security can be provided in different layers. The physical-layer security pro-
tocol may provide more security to a communication system together with the classical
computational security protocol.
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To achieve secure communication via information-theoretic approach is first introduced
and defined by Shannon [53]. In Shannon’s classical cryptosystem, Alice wants to trans-
mit the plaintext messages to the legitimate receiver Bob. But the eavesdropper Eve can
somehow access the insecure channel. Shannon assumed that the message received by Eve
is identical with the one received by Bob. To achieve the secure transmission, instead of
transmittings directly, Alice transmits the cipertextx, which is obtained by Alice as a
function of s and a secret keyk. The secrete keyk is shared by Alice and Bob. Shannon
proved that whenH(k) ≥ H(s), whereH(·) represents the entropy, thep rfect secrecycan
be achieved (the mutual information betweens andk is zero), i.e.,I(s; x) = 0.
In 1975, Wyner introduced another scenario of communication with information-theoretic
security [31]. In his seminal work, the wiretap channel is introduced. Generally, the secure
communication over wiretap channels can be realized by two categories of methods. The
first one is generating secrete keys and the other is forward coding. The secrete key gener-
ation/distribution problems in wiretap channels, which can be solved by the methodologies
of key generation from correlated source outputs, have beenextensively studied [54–56].
The objective of secure key distribution is for the sender Alice and the legitimate receiver
Bob to achieve a commonk-bit key about which the eavesdropper Eve’s entropy is max-
imal. In key distribution, the key can be unknown to Alice befor transmission and in
most protocols, it can be achieved by some level of interactive or one-way feed-forward
communication between Alice and Bob [54,55]. Powerful tools such as common random-
ness, advantage distillation, and privacy amplification were developed and studied [55,57].
Several key distribution protocols have been developed andstu ied for different wiretap
channel scenarios. Most key agreement protocols require exchanging information by way
of a parallel, error-free public channel between Alice and Bob.
In contrast to security key generation/distribution problem, the principle of the for-
ward coding methodology is to encodem-bit confidential messages in n-bit codewordx,
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through which both reliable and secure communication betwen Alice and Bob can be re-
alized. Theoretically, when the secrecy rate is below the secrecy capacity, there should
exists a coding scheme to achieve both reliable and secure transmission simultaneously.
Unfortunately, how to design the eff ctive codes for a wiretap channel is still an open prob-
lem. The early work of forward coding and modulation schemesfor wiretap channels are
provided in [31] and [58]. The code construction condition presented in [31] and [58] has
been extensively studied by Wei [59]. More recently, Thangarajet al. shows how to design
LDPC codes to achieve the secrecy capacity asymptotically for erasure wiretap channel
and noiseless main channel. Recently, several authors havepro d the existence of coding
schemes for various generalized wiretap channel scenarios. However, as discussed earlier,
it is very hard to design LDPC codes with any desired code rates. Moreover, the computa-
tion complexities for both encoding and decoding are quite high. In addition, in practical
system, the requirement for security may not be as strictly as the security criteria defined in
information-theoretic security problem. By scarifying some level of security, less computa-
tion complexity and more reliability can be realized. But, to our knowledge, the estimation
of security performance for LDPC codes with the secrecy rate, which is beyond the secrecy
capacity of the wiretap channel, are still not available.
2.4 Conclusion
In this chapter, we first introduce localized holographic data storage system. Based on
the working mechanism of the system, we model the system as a general communication
system with M-ary inputs and 2-D ISI channel. Next, we reviewthe existing detection tech-
nologies for ISI channel. But all the existing technologiescan not be applied directly to
detect the M-ary 2-D ISI channel either due to the constraintof computation complexity or
due to the detection error probability. A new computation-efficient detection algorithm for
M-ary 2-D ISI channel needs to be investigated. Then we describe the MIMO with MLD
or ZFD. By reviewing the existing results on the informationrates of MIMO system with
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ML receiver or ZF receive, we find that when inputs are discrete, the ultimate information
achieved by MLD or ZFD is actually less than the known value. Therefore, a more prac-
tical benchmark of the information rate of MIMO with MLD or ZFD needs to be studied.
Finally, we introduce the information-theoretic Securityand the relevant work on how to
realize information-theoretic security in wiretap channel. We also claim that a more robust
code design needs to be developed.
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CHAPTER 3
DETECTION AND CODE DESIGN FOR M-ARY 2-D ISI
CHANNEL
Localized holographic data storage is an alternative approach for next-generation mem-
ory schemes that is expected to exceed the fundamental limits of conventionaltwo-dimensional
(2-D) surface storage technologies like magnetic hard diskrives, optical disks, and semi-
conductor memories. Due to the misregistration and noise, the whole system can be mod-
eled as a communication system with M-ary inputs and 2-D ISI communication channel.
As summarized in Chapter2 the existing detection schemes can either achieve low detec-
tion error with unapplicable computation complexity, or realize computation efficiency by
sacrificing detection error rate.
In this chapter, we present an computationally efficient sub-optimal detection algorithm
and coding scheme for 2-D ISI channel with M-ary inputs by using multilevel coding [60–
62] and multistage decoding [63–65]. The basic idea is to equalize the channel stage by
stage. To begin with the stage with the highest signal power level, the multi-strip BCJR
algorithm is used to equalize each level by averaging the interference of the undecoded
levels. Both the hard and soft decisions are passed to the next stages. The detection scheme
hugely reduces the complexity of full-branch BCJR on the entir received page of data and
makes the detection algorithm applicable.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 3.1, we describe the
channel model and notations. In Section3.2, we present the detection mechanism for M-
ary 2-D ISI channel, which is multi-level coding and multi-sage decoding mechanism.
Section3.3 investigates the equalization algorithm at each stage, which computes the soft
information that is transferred to the next stage serving asa priori information. In Section
3.4, we compute the information rate of each level achieved by the proposed detection
algorithm. Section3.5presents the LDPC code [66–68] design to achieve the information
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rate given by Section3.4. Finally we conclude this chapter in Section3.6.
3.1 Channel Model









h(p, q)x(i − p, j − q) + n(i, j), (3.1)
wherex(i, j) ∈ {−M + 1, − M + 3, · · · ,M − 3, M − 1} is M-ary input andy(i, j) is the
corresponding output.n(i, j) is the post-detected noise, which is assumed to be Gaussian
noise with zero mean and with covarianceσ2In×n. h(p, q) is the discrete channel response
with finite span.Lx andLy represent, respectively, the interference depth of the channel in











The problem is how to detect the M-ary inputx(i, j) given y(i, j) and the channel re-
sponseh(p, q).
3.2 Detection Mechanism
This section introduces the detection mechanism. As it willbe shown as the following, to
realize M-ary inputs, a natural coding method ismulti-level coding(MLC) scheme, which
participates the information sequence into several blocks. In each block, a component
encoder is used to encode the block-wise information. Usingmultilevel coding, on each
level, we have a binary sequence. Different power is assigned to different levels. When
the sequences are transmitted through the channel, accordingly, the sequence on higher
level have higher SNR than the one on lower level. The resulted different SNR on different
levels provide the opportunity to detect the sequences stage by stage, which ismulti-stage
decoding(MLD).
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Figure 3.1.Multilevel coding scheme
3.2.1 Multilevel Coding
The MLC scheme used in the our detection algorithm is shown inFigure3.1. The user data
streamu are partitioned intoK = log2 M blocks fromu
(1) to u(K). M is the number of aries
of the inputs andK represents the number of levels that is needed for M-ary inputs. Each
symbol ofu(k) for k = 1, · · · ,K is a binary symbol,i.e., u(k)(i) ∈ {0, 1}. Next, each block
u(k) is encoded by the corresponding binary encoder on levelk to c(k). After getting the
codewordc(k) on levelk, each bit ofc(k), which is denoted asc(k)(i, j) is mapped to BPSK
signald(k)(i, j) ∈ {−1, 1}, where (i, j) denotes the symbol on (i, j) pixel. Now we have
got K encoded data block fromd(1) to d(K). The next step is to combine them together to
generate the M-ary input data stream. According to the design cr teria of multilevel coding,
different signal powerP(k) is assigned to levelk, with the largest powerP(K) being assigned
on levelK and the smallest powerP(1) being assigned on level 1. Up to the step, the M-ary








To decoded(k) via the received data pagey, we employmultistage decoding(MSD) method.
The multi-stage decoding mechanism implemented in the resea ch work is illustrated in
Figure3.2. Starting from levelK = log2 M, which has the highest signal power to level 1,
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the input sequences on different levels are decoded stage by stage. Given the received data
of the whole pagey, the soft information about the sequence on levelK is fist calculated.
The soft information is then passed to the decoder for levelK serving as a priori informa-
tion. Next, the decoder for levelK further computes the posteriori information about the
input sequence on levelK based on the encoding algorithm. The hard decision onK-th
sequence is drawn based on the posteriori information givenby the corresponding decoder.
Till now, the input sequence on levelK has been hard decoded. Both the posteriori infor-
mation and the hard decision for levelK are available now. Next stage is to decode the
input sequence on levelK − 1. To decode levelk− 1, the posteriori information for levelK
is taken as known information. Following the similar steps as decoding levelK, both the
posteriori information and the hard decision for levelK−1 are achieved after decoding level
K − 1. Then we are ready to enter the next stage, which is decodinglevel K − 2. Different
from decoding levelK −1, both the hard decision on levelK and the posteriori information
on levelK − 1 are sent to this stage as known information. Actually, the reason why we
would send the hard decision on levelK instead of sending the posteriori information on it
to save the computation complexity. Similarly, when decoding an arbitrary levelk, the hard
decision on levelk − 2 to K as well as the posteriori information on levelk − 1 are taken
as known information. All the sequences on different levels can be decoded following this
multistage decoding routine.
An extreme case for MSD is the input are binary sequence, thusthere is only one stage.
Once the stage is decoded, the whole input symbol is decoded.If the inputs are M-ary
symbols, there should be log2 M stages.
3.3 Equalization Algorithm
As presented in the previous section we adopt MLC and MSD as the coding and decoding
scheme. Now the remained question is how to equalize the interference of the 2-D ISI
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Figure 3.2.Multistage decoding mechanism
and 2-D ISI channel with binary inputs have been reviewed in Chapter2. However, when
the inputs are M-ary symbols, if we still use these existing technologies, the computation
complexity will be hugely increased. This section proposeda new equalization algorithm
which can efficiently equalize M-ary 2-D ISI channel with affordable computation com-
plexity. The fundamental idea is employing the BCJR algorithm on each stage iteratively
through the strips of the data page as in [9]. To reduce the computation complexity to an
affordable level, on each stage, instead of applying the full-branch BCJR algorithm, the
BCJR algorithm is only employed on reduced states by considering the bits from the un-
decoded levels as independently and identically distributed with equal probability. In this
proposed decoding approach, the computation complexity oneach binary input on each
level is reduced from 2Lx×Ly to MLx×Ly.
3.3.1 Multistage Multi-strip Equalization
For amaximum a posteriori(MAP) detection for binary 1-D ISI channel, the ultimate goal









wherey is the received sequence, andx(i) ∈ {−1, 1} is the i-th binary input. The MAP













−1, if LAPPR(i) > 0;
1, otherwise.
(3.5)
Though the BCJR algorithm is well proven to be efficient to equalize binary 1-D ISI
channel, there is no direct extension to 2-D case.
J. B. Soriaga et al propose iterative multi-strip BCJR approach [43] to calculate the
achievable information rates of multilevel codes for binary 2-D ISI channel, which provides
an sub-optimal detection algorithm to equalize bianry 2-D ISI channel. In classical multi-
strip BCJR algorithm, the whole system is modeled as finite-state system. The previous
state on (i, j)th output is given by
S′(i, j) =
{
x(i − Lx, j − Ly), x(i − Lx, j − Ly + 1), · · · , x(i, j − 1)
}
. (3.6)
To be convenient, we denote
{




x(i − Lx : i, j − Ly : j − 1)
}
. The current state is given by
S(i, j) =
{
x(i − Lx : i, j − Ly + 1 : j)
}
. (3.7)
It can be easily calculated that whenx(i, j) is binary, the number of states at (i, j)th output
is 2(Lx×Ly).
However, whenx(i, j) is M-ary, according to (3.6) and (3.7), the number of states at
each calculation branch is increased toM(Lx×Ly). the rapidly increasing number of the states
increases the computation complexity significantly and makes the multi-strip BCJR algo-
rithm unaffordable in the sense of computation complexity. To reduce the computation
complexity, we propose multistage multi-strip equalization, i.e., using multi-strip BCJR
algorithm stage by stage.
To realize MAP detection on every stage, we need to find out thek-t level LAPPR of
(i, j)th output, which is defined by
LAPPR(k)(i, j) = log
[
P(d(k)(i, j) = −1)|y

















−1, if LAPPR(k)(i, j) > 0;
1, otherwise.
(3.9)
To computeLAPPR(k)(i, j), the number of states is stillM(Lx×Ly). However, similar to clas-






L(d(k)(i, j)|y(i − p, :)), (3.10)
where
L(d(k)(i, j)|y(i, :)) = log
[
P(d(k)(i, j) = −1)|y(i, :)
P(d(k)(i, j) = 1|y(i, :))
]
, (3.11)
andy(i, :) = {y(i, 1), y(i, 2), · · · , y(i, n)}.
Now the problem has been converted from calculatingLAPPR(k)(i, j) to calculating
L(k)(i, j). At stagek, the input data from levelk + 1 to levelK is already available. If we




d(k)(i − Lx : i, j − Ly : j − 1)
}
, (3.12)
and the current state becomes
S(k)(i, j) =
{
d(k)(i − Lx : i, j − Ly + 1 : j)
}
. (3.13)
For example, if the size of the data page is 6× 7 andLx = Ly = 2, then as shown in Figure
(3.3(a), the previous state for the (4, 4)th data is{(3, 3), (3, 4), (4, 3), (4, 4)}, and the
current state for the (4, 4)th data is{(3, 4), (3, 5), (4, 4), (4, 5)}. For the next data,i.e.,the
(4, 5)th data, the precious state is changed to{(3, 4), (3, 5), (4, 4), (4, 5)} and the current
state is{(3, 5), (3, 6), (4, 5), (4, 6)} accordingly, which is shown is Figure3.3(b). Then
using multi-strip BCJR algorithm to go through the entireith row, L(d(k)(i, j)|y(i, :)) given
in (3.11) can be computed.
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(a) For (4, 4). (b) For (4, 5)
Figure 3.3.Previous and current states in multi-strip BCJR
If our assumption that the data on all levels except levelk is available is true, the prob-
lem is solved at this point. Also sinced(k)(i, j) ∈ {−1, 1} is binary, the number of states is
reduced from (Lx × Ly)M to (Lx × Ly)2. But notice that at stagek, the input data from level
1 to levelk − 1 is still undecided yet,i.e., those information is still unavailable at stagek.
How to precalculate the input data from level 1 to levelk − 1 is the problem that needs to
be solved to keep the number of states at the value of (Lx × Ly)2 at stagek. This solution of
the problem is given as in the following.
3.3.2 Gaussian Approximation on Multistage Multi-strip Equalization
The remained problem is how to computeL(k)(i, j) at the channel detector of level k. No-
tice that from the definition ofL(k)(i, j) given in (3.10), L(k)(i, j) can be computed by sum-
ming upL(d(k)(i, j)|y(i − p, :)) for p = 0, 1, · · · , Lx. The problem is transferred to com-
pute L(d(k)(i, j)|y(i − p, :)). According to classical BCJR algorithm the key to calculate
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′, s) = logP(y(i, j)|s′(k)(i, j), s(k)(i, j))P(s′(k)(i, j), s(k)(i, j)). (3.14)
In (3.14), P(s′(k)(i, j), s(k)(i, j)) is easy to be calculated since we assume the input data
areidentically independently distributed(i.i.d.). But to computeP(y(i, j)|s′(k)(i, j), s(k)(i, j)),
we have
P(y(i, j)|s′(k)(i, j), s(k)(i, j))
= P
(













Via (3.15), we needd̃(1:k−1)(i, j) to calculateP(y(i, j)|s′(k)(i, j), s(k)(i, j)), which is still not
available at stage k. However according to central limited theorem we can assume that
P
(
y(i, j)|d̂(k+1:K)(i − Ly : i, j − Lx, j), d(k)(i − Ly : i, j − Lx, j)
)
approximated follows normal
distribution. Hence we give the following proposition
Proposition 3.3.1 The distribution of the probability of y(i, j) given the input data on level
k and the estimated data from level k+1 to K can be approximated as a normal distribution,
the approximated distribution is given by
P
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(1:k−1)(i − Lx : i, j − Ly : j)), (3.17)

























is the variance. A0, A1, and A2 are given by






























































































W is the number of possible combinations of
{
d̃(1:k−1)(i − Lx : i, j − Ly : j)
}
.
Combining (3.15) and (3.16), we have






























can be computed off line. There-
fore, the number of states in stagek keeps at (Lx × Ly)2.
3.3.3 Detection Steps
The details of the complete equalization algorithm are summarized as follows:
1. The 2-D ISI channel can be modeled as a Markov channel with finite-state machine.
The previous state of the (i, j) pixel at levelk S′(k)(i, j) is defined in (3.12), and the
current stateS(k)(i, j) is given by (3.13);
2. Since we adopt multistage equalization, at any given level k, the data from levelk+1
to levelK should be available at decoding stagek;
3. The branch metric of individual BCJRγ(k)i, j (s
′, s) can be approximated via (3.22);
4. Carry the multi-strip BCJR algorithm on levelk based on the branch metricγ(k)i, j (s
′, s)
to computeL(d(k)(i, j)|y(i, :));
5. L(k)(i, j) is computed via (3.10);
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6. PassL(k)(i, j) to the decoder at levelk.
Notice that in the proposed Gaussian approximated multi-stage multi-strip equalization
algorithm, we avoid computing the exact value ofP(y(i, j)|s′(k)(i, j), s(k)(i, j)). Instead we
equalize the channel stage by stage by computingL(k)(i, j) defined in (3.10). On each stage,
based on central limited theorem, the distribution of
P
(
y(i, j)|d̂(k+1:K)(i − Ly : i, j − Lx, j), d(k)(i − Ly : i, j − Lx, j)
)
is approximated by a normal
distribution, the mean and variance of which can be computedoffline via (3.17) and (3.18),
respectively. Hence the number of states at each stage is reduced fromMLx×Ly to 2Lx×Ly [45].
3.4 Achievable Information Rate
In section3.3, we propose an equalization algorithm to equalize M-ary 2-DISI channel.
However to further reduce the detection error probability,the channel code needs to be
designed, through which the detection error goes to zero with infinite length of codewords.
From information theory, we know that with the same codewordlength, the more redun-
dancy you add to the original transmitted information, the smaller the bit error rate is. But
extra redundancy reduces the transmission effici ncy. How to find out the minimum infor-
mation redundancy such that the detection error still goes tzero with infinite codeword
length is the problem discussed in this section.
First, we give the definition ofachievable information rate(AIR) with the equalization
approach proposed in section3.3.
Definition 3.4.1 The AIR at level k is themutual information(MI) between the inputs on
the k-th level and the soft information given by the proposedequalization approach, which
is L(k)(i, j) in our system.
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By the definition, we have
I
(











































dL(k)(i, j)|d(k)(i, j) (3.23)
whereI
(
d(k)(i, j); L(k)(i, j)
)









is theprobability density function











(3.23) provides a method to calculate the AIR by Monte-Carlo simulation, which is
summarized as the following:
1. Simulate the transmission over the M-ary 2-D ISI channelN times withi.i.d. M-ary
input symbols.
2. For each simulation, on every equalization stage, calculteL(k)(i, j) by following the
proposed multi-stage multi-strip Gaussian approximated equalization algorithm.









accordingly by using kernel function
on the corresponding histogram.








in (3.23) to compute the
AIR of level k.
Notice that there should be no encoding in the scheme when we compute the AIR, which
meansd(k)(i, j) is i.i.d. data without any coding gains.
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andM = 8. Figure3.4(a)and Figure3.4(b), respectively,
shows the AIR at level 2 and the total AIR of the total log2 M = 3 levels. The AIR with the
ISI-freeadditive white Gaussian noise(AWGN) channel is also plotted for comparison. On
level 2, when SNR is 12 dB, the gap between the Gaussian channel and 8-ary 2-D ISI chan-
nel is about 0.1bits per channel use. The gap is caused by two factors. The first one is that
2-D ISI channel has 2-D interference between symbols. Hencewith the same SNR, Gaus-
sian channel definitely has much higher channel capacity than 2-D ISI channel. Further-
more, since there is no interference in Gaussian channel, the 2-D Gaussian channel can be
modeled as parallel scaler Gaussian channels. In other words, 2-D Gaussian is equivalent to
parallel 1-D Gaussian channel, which reduce the channel dimension of transmission from
two to one. The second reason causes the gap is that the proposed Gaussian-approximated
equalization algorithm is a sub-optimal equalization approach, which means the decisions
given by the Gaussian-approximated equalization are not MAP decisions. However, the
presented detection approach offers a sub-optimal way to efficiently equalize M-ary 2-D
ISI channel.
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8-ary 2-D ISI channel
AWGN channel
(a) AIR of level 2.

























8-ary 2-D ISI channel
AWGN channel
(b) Total AIR of 3 levels.
Figure 3.4.Comparison of AIRs between AWGN channel and M-ary 2-D ISI channel.
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3.5 Code Design and Simulation Results
Semi-algebraic LDPC [69] component codes with code rates 0.4, 0.7 and 0.8 for level 1,
level 2, and level 3, respectively, are used in the scheme. With the condition of perfectly
decoded bits of the previous stage, the averaged BER performance of the multilevel codes
is shown in Figure3.5(a). The performance of the proposed scheme in the 2-D ISI channel
is about 2.3 dB inferior to the AWGN channel. Figure3.5(b) shows the performance at
level 2, which is less than 1.8 dB inferior to the AWGN channelwith the perfect feedback
from level 3.
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8-ary 2-D ISI channel
AWGN channel
(a) The average BER of 3 levels.



















8-ary 2-D ISI channel
AWGN channel
(b) BER of level 2.
Figure 3.5.BER performance with semi-algebraic LDPC codes.
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3.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have investigated a new multilevel coding a d multistage decoding
scheme for M-ary 2-D ISI channel. The fundamental idea is to deco e the input stage by
stage. In each stage, based on the soft and hard decoding results of the decoded levels,
the BCJR algorithm is employed iteratively through the strip of the data page as in [43].
To reduce the computation complexity to an affordable level, in each stage, instead of
applying the full-branch BCJR algorithm, the BCJR algorithm is only employed on reduced
states by considering the bits from the undecoded levels as independently and identically
distributed with equal probability. In this presented approach, the computation complexity
for each stage is reducedMLx×Ly to 2Lx×Ly [45]. Such huge complexity reduction makes the
computation affordable and practical.
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CHAPTER 4
INFORMATION RATE LOSS INDUCED BY
MAXIMUM-LIKELIHOOD AND ZERO-FORCING DETECTORS
Multiple-Input, Multiple-Output (MIMO) systems have receiv d a great deal of atten-
tion because of the increase in the transmitted informationrate and reliability. Existing
results on fundamental limits of MIMO systems are focused onthe assumption of contin-
uous signals at the receiver side and the eff ct of detectors has largely not been addressed.
However, in practical digital communication systems, whenthe inputs are discrete the con-
tinuous outputs given by the receivers have to be mapped to the alp abet of the transmitted
signals,i.e. the final outputs should also have discrete values. We refer to the ML (ZF) re-
ceiver with the hard mapping step as the ML (ZF) detector and call the hard outputs given
by detectors as the detected signals. The hard detection step has not been considered before
in the related work.
In this chapter, we focus our study on themutual information(MI) of the discrete
MIMO channels with two widely adopted detectors, one is the MLD and the other is the
ZFD. To differentiate from the MI without hard mapping step, we refer theon here as
post-detection mutual information(PMI). We need to emphasize that the PMI which we
consider in this paper is the MI between two specific discretev ctors which belong to finite
alphabets,i.e., one vector is the transmitted discrete vector, the other isthe hard detected
vector given by MLD or ZFD. We first establish the definition and analytical expression of
the PMI with MLD and ZFD. We observe that there is no closed form for the PMI with
MLD or ZFD. However, whenphase-shift keying(PSK) symbols are employed, we present
an asymptotically tight lower bound of the PMI with MLD or ZFD. The lower bounds
are easily computed which allows us to evaluate the ultimateachievable information rates
for MIMO systems with detectors. Furthermore, whenquadrature amplitude modulation
(QAM) symbols are employed, we provide a simple numerical method to compute the
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PMI with ZFD which is shown to exactly match the simulation results. Since the hard
mapping step in the detector is irreversible, we expect thatthe PMI is reduced compared to
the MI without hard mapping. The conclusion is confirmed by both the simulation and the
theoretic results. Consequently, the ultimate achievablePMI rates that can be transmitted
through the MIMO channels with MLD or ZFD serve as more practical benchmarks for
transmissions.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In Section4.1, we review the general
MIMO channel model as well as the definitions for MLD and ZFD discussed in the chapter.
Moreover, we give the definition of PMI and explore the meaning of PMI. In Section4.2we
derive the lower bound of the PMI with MLD when the inputs are chosen from PSK sym-
bols. Section4.3first presents the lower bound of the PMI with ZFD when PSK symbols
are used, and then the numerical expression of the PMI with ZFD employing QAM sym-
bols is derived. Simulation results are presented in Section 4.5and Section4.6 concludes
the chapter.
4.1 Problem Formulation
In this section, we first give the system model, and then present th problem itself and the
meaning of the problem.Post-detection mutual information(PMI) is introduced, which
will be shown later, as the more practical bench mark in MIMO system with detectors.
4.1.1 System Model and Problem Formulation
In this section, we review the system model, which is discussed in this chapter. For a
discrete-time MIMO channel withM transmitters andN receivers, the relationship between
the outputy, the input symbols, and the channel responseH is given by
y = Hs + ω, (4.1)
wherey is theN × 1 vector,s is theM × 1 transmitted signal,H is anN × M complex
Gaussian distributed channel matrix, andω is i.i.d. zero-mean complex Gaussian noise
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with covariance matrixE[ωωH ] = σ2ωIN. In the following discussion we focus on the case
of M = N.
Let sk be thek-th element ofs, which is drawn from complex QAM or PSK constella-





whereEs = E[|sk|2] andN0 = 2σ2ω.
We define that the detection process includes equalizing thereceived vectory and hard
mapping the equalized vector to finite constellation.
(a) The scheme of ZFD.
(b) The scheme of MLD.
Figure 4.1.The scheme of ZFD and MLD.
The structure of ZFD is shown in Figure4.1(a). The first step is equalizing the received
vectory, which is given as
x = H†y = s + η, (4.3)
whereH† = (HHH)−1HH , x is the equalized vector, andη = H†ω. The covariance matrix
of the equalized noiseη is
W = E[ηηH ] = H†(H†)
H
E[ωωH ] = σ2ω(H
HH)−1. (4.4)
As shown in (4.4), the equalization introduces the correlation among the noise entries.
However, in the hard mapping step of the ZFD, the correlations among the noise entries
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are not considered. The ZFD mapsx ymbol by symbol. For example, thek-th entry ofx
denoted asxk is mapped to the alphabetS by
ŝk = Qs(xk) = arg
s̃k∈S
min‖xk − s̃k‖2, k = 1, · · · ,N, (4.5)
whereQs(·) represents the hard mapping operation of ZFD, and ˆsk is the k-th detected
symbol of the detected signal ˆsZF given by ZFD.
Different from ZFD, MLD directly maps the received vectory to an M-dimensional
spaceSM, i.e.,
ŝML = Qv(y) = arg
s̃∈SM
min‖y − Hs̃‖2, (4.6)
whereQv(·) represents the hard mapping operation of MLD and ˆsML is the final detected
signal given by MLD. The hard mapping operation of MLD given in (4.6) is equivalent to
quantizing the equalized vectorx toSM. The equivalent form of (4.6) is
ŝML = Qv(x) = arg
s̃∈SM
min(x − s̃)H W−1 (x − s̃) , (4.7)
and the structure of the equivalent MLD is shown in Figure4.1(b).
The question is what is the mutual information between the input symbolss and the
estimated symbolsM̂L/ŝZF given by MLD/ZFD. As reviewed in Chapter 2,all the existing
results have not considered the information loss in the finalhard mapping step in the de-
tection. However the information loss in the hard mapping step does exit and affect the
detection. This chapter answer the question by quantifyingthe information loss induced
by the hard mapping step. The information loss that has been nglected before actually
confirms that the achievable information rate with MLD or ZFDshould be less than the
known value.
4.1.2 The definition and meaning of PMI
To consider the ignored information rate loss, we introducea new metric, which ispost-
detection mutual information(PMI), to quantify the ultimate information rate that can be
achieved in MIMO system with detectors. First, we give the definition of PMI.
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Definition 4.1.1 WhenH is known, the PMI of a MIMO system with MLD or ZFD is,
respectively, the mutual information between the transmitted signal and the hard detected
signal given by MLD or ZFD, i.e., the PMI with MLD isI(s; ŝML|H), while the PMI with
ZFD isI(s; ŝZF|H).
Now let us explore the meaning of PMI. Consider a widely used MIMO system with
receivers and error-control coding. The ML or ZF receiver computes the log-likelihood
ratio (LLR) of each bit of the transmitted symbols based on the raw resulting outputs of the
channel and the channel response. The LLRs are transferred to the decoder as the priori
information for decoding. Next, the decoders compute the LLR of each bit based on the
priori information provided by the receiver. Finally, the hard decoded bits are determined
via the LLR given by the decoders. When we design the error-control codes, we need to ask
what code rates should be used. Obviously, the highest achievable code rates should be the
ultimate achievable information rates of the systems. FromShannon’s theorem we know
that the ultimate achievable information rates of a communication system should be the MI
between the inputs and outputs of that system without codinggains. For MIMO systems
with an ML or ZF receiver, since the final hard decoding step ofthe decoder should be
taken into account, the ultimate achievable code rates of the system are no longer the MI
between the discrete inputs and the continuous outputs given by the receivers [29]. Instead,
the ultimate achievable code rates of the MIMO systems with an ML or ZF receiver should
be equivalent to the MI between the discrete inputs and the discrete outputs of the MIMO
systems with MLD or ZFD, respectively. Therefore, the PMI isactually the highest code
rates that we can apply in MIMO systems with an ML or ZF receiver [?,70]. The goal of
our work is to find the value of it.
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4.2 Post-Detection Mutual Information with Maximum-Likel ihood De-
tector
In this section, we first consider the MIMO systems with MLD and develop the analytical
expression of the PMI with MLD defined in (4.6) or (4.7). We assume perfect channel
knowledge is available at the receiver and the input symbolsare uniformly distributed over
the finite alphabetS. We develop the PMI with MLD based on the definition of it. Note
that the channel has discrete input discrete output under the definition of the MLD.
Proposition 4.2.1 When PSK symbols are transmitted, the PMI of a MIMO system with
MLD is given by












where q is the size of the PSK constellationS, s is the transmitted signal vector and̂sML
given in (4.6) or (4.7) is the detected vector with MLD.
Actually, because of the correlation between the transmitted symbols, there is no closed
form to get the PMI with MLD. But when PSK symbols are employed, the symbols have
equal energy and they can be exchanged with each other without c anging the performance
of the system. Therefore, in this section we focus on PSK symbols to derive a lower bound
of the PMI with MLD.
From (4.8), we observe that boths and ŝML are discrete (belonging to finite alphabets),
and thus the PMI is no longer calculated by the integral of some probability density function
(PDF). Instead, it is expressed by the error and correct detection probabilities. The error
probability is defined as the probability that the detected signal vector ˆsML is sv but the
transmitted signal vectors is su. The correct detection probability is the probability that
the detection signal vector is exactly the transmitted signal vector. It is obvious from (4.8)
that the key point to calculate the PMI is to know both the error and correct detection
probabilities.
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Let us work on the error probability first. According to the definition of the MLD given
in (4.7) we have
P(ŝML = sv|s = su, u , v,H)
= P
(


























‖x − sk‖2W−1 = (x − sk)
HW−1(x − sk). (4.10)




≤ ‖x− sk2‖2W−1, k1 , k2 , v, are independent to each other, and thus
the error probability can be computed by










































is the pair-wise error probability givens = su.
Lemma4.2.2in the following provides the method to compute the pair-wise error proba-
bility.
Lemma 4.2.2 Given the system model in (2.3), whens = su we have
P
(






















exp(− t22 )dt is the Q function,µML(uv) andσ2ML(uv) are determined
as
µML(uv) = ‖su − sv‖2W−1, andσ
2
ML(uv) = 2‖su − sv‖2W−1. (4.13)
Unfortunately, the covariance matrixW is usually a non-diagonal one, which makes the
two events‖x − sv‖2W−1 ≤ ‖x − sk1‖
2
W−1
and‖x − sv‖2W−1 ≤ ‖x − sk2‖
2
W−1
, k1 , k2 , v, not
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independent to each other any more. Under such conditions, (4.11) can not hold. How to
get the error probability with a non-diagonal covariance matrix is the problem we need to
solve now. WhenW is non-diagonal, there is no closed form for the error probability given
in (4.9). However, a simple asymptotically tight bound for the error probability is presented
in the following lemma.
Lemma 4.2.3 Given the system model in (2.3), the MLD in (4.7) and the transmitted signal
s = su, we have









whereµML(uv) andσ2ML(uv) are given in (4.13).
Now we give some numerical examples to verify how well the upper bound given in lemma
4.2.3approaches the true error probability.
Example 1:We examine how well the PDF of the normal distribution with meanµML(uv)
and varianceσ2ML(uv) matches the real PDF ofDmax, where
Dmax(u, v) = max
(
‖x − sv‖2W−1 − ‖x − sk‖
2
W−1,∀k , v|s = su
)
. (4.15)
Actually, the normal PDF with meanµML(uv) and varianceσ2ML(uv) is the PDF of the
distribution of the upper bound of the pair-wise error probability given in Lemma 2. The
real PDF ofDmax is obtained by plotting the histogram which is achieved by reco ding
Dmax for 50, 000 random realizations of the channel. In this example, 4-PSK symbols are
employed.
First, we examine 2× 2 MIMO channels. Two channel matricesHa1 and Ha2 are
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The results are plotted in Fig.4.2. We observe that atS NR= 2dB for both Ha1 andHa2
the PDFs of the upper bound match well with the histograms from simulation. But when
S NRdecreases to−8dB, there exists a gap between the two PDFs.























Figure 4.2.PDFs ofDmax with M = N = 2.
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The results are shown in Fig.4.3. Similar to the results in Fig.4.2, the PDFs of the upper
bound still match well with the PDFs from the simulations when S NR= 2dB. But the gap
emerges whenS NR= −8dB. On the other hand, it is also observed from both Fig.4.2and
Fig. 4.3 that the numbers of transmitters and receivers do not affect how tight the upper
bound is. Therefore the example verifies the eff ctiveness of the conclusion ofLemma 2.























Figure 4.3.PDFs ofDmax with M = N = 3.
With lemma4.2.3, we have the following claim on the correct detection probability.
Lemma 4.2.4 Given the system model in (2.3), the MLD in (4.7) and the transmitted signal
s = su, we have













Proof: Plugging (4.14) in (4.20), the result is ready to obtain. 
46
Remark: For MLD, the worst case is that the noise power is infinite. Under such a
condition we have
P(ŝML = su|s = su,H) = P(ŝML = sv|s = su, u , v, H) =
1
|S|M . (4.22)
But when the noise power is constrained, the following expressions should hold:
P(ŝML = su|s = su,H) > P(ŝML = sv|s = su, u , v, H), and (4.23)
P(ŝML = su|s = su,H) >
1
|S|M , (4.24)
which means with any finite noise power, the correct detection pr bability is always greater
than the error probability. Therefore to make the lower bound more precisely, we adopt the












, ∀v , u. (4.25)
If (4.25) holds, since
∑
sv
P(ŝML = sv|s = su,H) = 1, (4.26)











With the conclusions in lemma4.2.3and lemma4.2.4, we present the lower bound of the
PMI with MLD by employing PSK constellations.
Theorem 4.2.5 Given the system model in (2.3) and the MLD in (4.7), if (4.25) holds, we
have
I(s; ŝML|H)

















































































Note that the lower bound in (4.28) also serves as an approximation of the PMI when
QAM constellations are adopted.
In this section, we first derive the analytical expression ofthe PMI with MLD for any
symbols. But it is shown that there is no closed form for the PMI. However, when PSK con-
stellations are adopted, we propose an easily computed asymptotically tight lower bound
of it, which allows us to evaluate the performance of the MIMOsystems with MLD and
design optimal error control codes for the systems. In the next s ction, we study the PMI
with ZFD.
4.3 Post-Detection Mutual Information with Zero-Forcing Detector
Similar to the PMI with MLD, the PMI with ZFD is the mutual information between the
transmitted signals and the detected signal ˆsZF given by the ZFD, which is
I(s; ŝZF|H)
= H(s) − H(s|ŝZF,H)
























P(ŝZF = sv|s = su,H) log2
P(ŝZF = sv|s = su,H)
∑
sp∈SM




















The PMI with ZFD is also determined by the error and the correct d tection probabilities.
But as shown in Section4.2, it is difficult to get the closed form of the probabilities even
with ZFD. However, the PMI with ZFD is studied as follows based on two different types
of symbols,i.e.,PSK and QAM.
4.3.1 The PMI with ZFD for PSK symbols
When PSK constellations are adopted, similar to proposition 4.2.1, the PMI with ZFD for
PSK symbols is given by the following proposition.
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Proposition 4.3.1 When PSK symbols are transmitted, the PMI of a MIMO system with
ZFD is given by







P(ŝZF = sv|s = su,H) log2 P(ŝZF = sv|s = su,H).
(4.30)
There is still no closed form for the PMI with ZFD for PSK symbols. However, we also
propose an easily computed asymptotically tight lower bound of it. But before presenting
the lower bound, there are three lemmas to be given first.
Lemma 4.3.2 Givens = su, for any constellation,sv is the detected vector with ZFD given
in (4.5) if and only if
(x − sv)†Λ(x − sv) ≤ (x − sk)†Λ(x − sk), ∀k , v, (4.31)
whereΛ is any diagonal matrix with all positive diagonal entries.
With the result of Lemma4.3.2, the error probability with ZFD is
P(ŝZF = sv|s = su, u , v,H) = P
(











‖x − sv‖2Λ − ‖x − sk‖2Λ
)









and thus the scaler minimum distance criteria of ZFD are equivalent to a minimum vector
distance criterion. Similar to the case of the error probability with MLD, there is no closed
form of (4.32). However, we have the following pair-wise error probability.
Lemma 4.3.3 Given the system model in (2.3) and the ZFD in (4.5), whens = su we have
P
(







whereµZF(uv) andσ2ZF(uv) are determined as
µZF(uv) = ‖su − sv‖2Λ andσ2ZF(uv) = 2(su − sv)†ΛWΛ(su − sv). (4.34)
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Proof: The proof is similar as the proof of lemma4.2.2.
Furthermore, we have the upper and lower bounds of the error and correct detection
probabilities of ZFD, which are presented in the following lemma.
Lemma 4.3.4 Given the system model in (2.3) and the ZFD in (4.5), if s = su, we have













whereµZF(uv) andσZF(uv) are given in (4.34) andΛ in (4.34) is any non-identity diagonal
matrix with all positive diagonal entries.
Remark: To make Lemma4.3.4valid, there is one thing to emphasize thatΛ cannot
be identity matrix. The reason for that is ifΛ = IM then‖s − sv‖2Λ = ‖s − sv‖2 cannot be
randomized weighted on different entries ofs − sv. Thus, the distribution of
max
(
‖x − sv‖2Λ − ‖x − sk‖2Λ|s = su,∀k , v
)
is no longer Gaussian-like.
Now we are ready to present the lower bound of the PMI with ZFD when PSK symbols
are transmitted.
Theorem 4.3.5 Given the system model in (2.3) and the ZFD in (4.5), we have
















































































Proof: The proof is similar to the proof of Theorem4.2.5.
Theorem4.3.5provides a lower bound for the PMI with ZFD for PSK symbols. When
the transmitted symbols are QAM symbols, the exact value of the PMI with ZFD can be
numerically computed.
4.3.2 The PMI with ZFD for QAM symbols
When QAM symbols are transmitted, neither Theorem4.2.5nor Theorem4.3.5holds any
longer. However, we observe that the error and the correct detection probabilities are still
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needed to compute the PMI with ZFD. Actually, both the error and the correct detection
probabilities can be computed by integrating theprobability density function(PDF) of the
equalized signalx over the corresponding decision cells. For example, the error p obability
is




whereΩŝZF=sv is the decision cell for ˆsZF = sv. For instance, in a 2× 2 MIMO system,
when 4-QAM symbols are applied, the decision cell for ˆsZF = [1+ i 1+ i]T is ΩŝZF=sv =
{x1, x2 : Re{x1} > 0, Im{x1} > 0, Re{x2} > 0, and Im{x4} > 0}. The coordinates of the




























where z is a 2M × 1 vector and the joint distribution of all the entries ofz is known to
be multivariate Gaussian distributed. Therefore, the integral in (4.38) is a multivariate
Gaussian integral overΩŝZF=sv [71–73]. In fact, the multivariate Gaussian integral over any
cell is still an unsolved problem. But notice that for any QAMsymbols, the coordinates
of the edge points of the decision cells given by ZFD are all constant. With the constant
coordinates of the edge points, the integral in (4.38) can be decomposed into multiple one-
variate normal integrals. The decomposition of the integral in (4.38) offers a foundation to
numerically calculate the PMI with ZFD. The details are given in the following.
First, we need to find the covariance matrix ofz, which is defined as
Σ = E[ zzT ]. (4.40)
Lemma 4.3.6 Given the equalized vectorx in (4.3), the covariance matrixΣ defined in
51































































AAT + BBT ABT − BAT













whereA = Re{H†} andB = Im{H†}.
Now the joint PDF ofz givens = su can be expressed by








(z − υ)TΣ−1(z − υ)
]
, (4.43)
whereυ = [Re{sTu } Im{sTu }]T . Based on (4.43) we have
































= F(su, sv,Σ) (4.44)
whereasv,k andbsv,k, for k = 1, · · · , 2M, denote the lower and higher boundaries of thek-th
domain ofΩŝZF=sv,
csv,k = asv,k − υk and dsv,k = bsv,k − υk. (4.45)
For example, with 4-QAM constellation, if ˆsZF = s1 = [1+ i 1+ i]T and s = s3 =
[1− i 1− i]T , thenυ = [1 1 − 1 − 1], as1,k = 0 andbs1,k = +∞, for k = 1, 2, · · ·4.
By (4.45), cs1,1 = cs1,2 = 0 − 1 = −1, cs1,3 = cs1,4 = 0 − (−1) = 1 andds1,k = +∞, for
k = 1, 2, · · ·4. As we discussed at the beginning of this section,asv,k, bsv,k, csv,k anddsv,k are
constant fork = 1, 2, · · ·2M once the constellation is known.
Now let us work on the multivariate Gaussian integral in (4.44). Actually, the computa-
tion of multivariate normal probability is a widely attractive problem. The pioneer research
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work on it began in the 1960s. With the development of engineer g techniques, people
have become more and more interested in it. Unfortunately, by now, only a few special
cases can be worked out. The calculation ofF(su, sv,Σ) defined in (4.44) is one of the
special cases that has constant integral limits. We adopt the method presented in [74] to
compute the integral. SinceΣ is a covariance matrix, it is symmetric and semi-definite and
it has Choleskey decomposition. LetΣ = LLT, whereL is a lower-triangular matrix with




















































After some transformation we have
z′TΣ−1z′ = z′T L−T L−1z′ = ϕTϕ (4.47)



















































Based on (4.48), F(su, sv,Σ) can be numerically calculated. The details are given in [74].
Now we are ready to present the following theorem, which gives the answer to the PMI
with ZFD for QAM symbols.
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Theorem 4.3.7 When QAM constellations are employed, the PMI with ZFD in (4.30) is















































where F(sp, sv,Σ) is given in (4.48)-(4.50).
Proof: Plugging (4.44) in (4.30), (4.51) is obtained. 
Now we give some remarks on when QAM constellation is adopted, an why the exact
numerical calculation of the PMI with ZFD can be carried out bMLD can not. The
reason is the nature characteristics of MLD and ZFD themselve . From (4.5) and (4.7),
we can see that the preliminary difference between the ZFD and MLD is the way they
quantify the equalized vectorx. ZFD quantifiesx symbol by symbol. As discussed before,
the coordinates of the edge points of the decision cells are always constant when a QAM
constellation is employed. Thus the integral in (4.44) can be decomposed into multiple
one-variate normal integrals. But the situation is totallydifferent for MLD. For MLD we
have




whereΩŝML=sv is the decision cell for ˆsML = sv. Different from ZFD, the coordinates of the
edge points of the decision cellΩŝML=sv are the solutions of
‖x − sv‖2W−1 = ‖x − su‖
2
W−1,∀su ∈ S
Mandu , v. (4.53)
It is obvious from (4.53), that when the covariance matrixW is not a diagonal matrix, the
coordinates are not constant any more. Instead they are somevariables satisfying (4.53).
First of all, it is very hard to calculate the solutions of (4.53). Even if they are calculated,
we still need to do multivariate Gaussian integral overΩŝML=sv to get the PMI with MLD.
Unfortunately, the multivariate Gaussian integral with any integral cell is still an unsolved
problem in mathematics. Therefore, the PMI with MLD cannot be numerically computed.
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4.4 Relationship between PMI with MLD and PMI with ZFD
When the transmitted symbols are from PSK constellations, we have presented the lower
bounds of the PMI with MLD and ZFD. When QAM constellations are pplied, the exact
numerical computation of the PMI with ZFD is also presented.Now let us try to find
out the underling fundamental parameter that brings the diff rence between the PMI with
MLD and ZFD. Actually, when a Gaussian symbol is applied, Ma and Zhang [28] show
that the orthogonality deficiency of the channel matrixH, which is denoted byod(H), is
the parameter that directly affects the difference between the channel capacities with MLE
and ZFE. The question is what happens with MLD and ZFD. In the following we give a
partial answer to this question.
Theorem 4.4.1 Given the system model in (2.3), if od(H) = 0, we have
I(s; ŝML|H) = I(s; ŝZF|H), (4.54)
where od(H) is the orthogonal deficiency ofH and is defined by [28]





andhm is the m-th column ofH.
4.5 Numerical Results
Simulation results are presented to verify the conclusionsclaimed in this paper. The chan-
nel model is given in (2.3) and the channel matrix is complex Gaussian distributed. A
4-PSK (which is the same as 4-QAM) constellation is adopted as the modulation type.
First, we compare the average and outage mutual informationw th different system
models. Figure4.4(a)shows the average channel capacities, the average MI with MLR or
ZFR, and the average PMI with MLD or ZFD. When the input is allowed to be continuous,
channel capacities with both MLR and ZFR increase monotonically as SNR increases and
there is no constraint for them. When the input symbols are 4-PSK symbols, the MI with
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MLR or ZFR and the PMI with MLD or ZFD are obtained from Monte Carlo simulations.
The channels are 2× 2 complex Gaussian distributed. Verified by Figure4.4(a), the quan-
tization in MLD or ZFD does reduce the MI compared with the MI without quantization.
When SNR is below 6dB, the difference is around 0.2 bits/channel use. Figure4.4(b)shows
the outage results. The outage MI is defined by
P{I(H) < Iout} = ε. (4.56)
In Figure4.4(b), ε = 0.1. As shown in Figure4.4(b), when SNR is below 4dBthe difference
between the MI with MLR and MLD is about 0.4 bits/channel use. The outage results verify
the reduction induced by the quantization again.
Next we examine how well the lower bounds proposed in this proposal match the simu-
lated results obtained from Monte Carlo simulations. In Figure4.5(a), we plot the average
PMI with MLD or ZFD from the simulation and the lower bounds ofthe PMI given in The-
orem4.2.5and4.3.5. From Figure4.5(a), we observe that when SNR is larger than 4dB,
the difference between the average PMI and its lower bound proposed in Theorems4.2.5
and4.3.5is less than 0.2 bits/channel use. When SNR is higher, the difference between
the curves from the simulation and the curves obtained from Theorem4.2.5and4.3.5are
smaller. As we proposed in Theorem4.3.7, when QAM constellations are adopted, the
PMI with ZFD can be exactly numerically computed by (4.51). As shown in Figure4.5(a),
the results obtained by (4.51) match exactly with the results from Monte Carlo simulations.
In Figure4.5(b), we plot the outage results withε = 0.1. Similar conclusions can be drawn
from the outage results in Figure4.5(b).
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Channel capacity with MLR
Channel capacity with ZFR
Average MI with MLR
Average MI with ZFR
Average PMI with MLD
Average PMI with ZFD
(a) Average results.





































Outage MI with MLR
Outage MI with ZFR
Outage MI with MLR
Outage MI with ZFR
Outage PMI with MLD
Outage PMI with ZFD
(b) Outage results withε = 0.1.
Figure 4.4.Channel capacities with MLR and ZFR, MI with MLR and ZFR for 4- PSK and the PMI
with MLD and ZFD for 4-PSK, M = N = 2.
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the average PMI with MLD from simulation
the average PMI with ZFD from simulation
the average PMI with ZFD from Theorem4.3.7
the lower bound of the PMI with ZFD from Theorem4.3.5
the lower bound of the PMI with MLD from Theorem4.2.5
(a) Average results.
































the outage PMI with MLD from simulation
the outage PMI with ZFD from simulation
the outage PMI with ZFD from Theorem4.3.7
the lower bound of the PMI with ZFD from Theorem4.3.5
the lower bound of the PMI with MLD from Theorem4.2.5
(b) Outage results.
Figure 4.5.Simulated PMI and the lower bounds of PMI with MLD and ZFD for 4 -PSK andM = N = 2.
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4.6 Conclusion
This is the first time to study the influence of quantization onthe mutual information for
communications. First of all, we derive the analytical expression of the PMI with MLD
or ZFD. Then the easily computed asymptotically lower bounds of them are proposed for
PSK constellations. The lower bounds also serve as the approximations when QAM con-
stellations are adopted. Furthermore, when QAM constellations are adopted, we provide
the closed form of the PMI with ZFD. The values obtained from the closed formula match
exactly the results from the simulations. We have also shownthat whenod(H) = 0, the
PMI with MLD or ZFD is equal to each other which is consistent wi h the case for the




RANDOM COMPLEX FIELD CODE DESIGN FOR SECURITY
OVER WIRETAP CHANNELS
Security has become one of the main concerns for communications. Among all mali-
cious attacks, eavesdropping is a large class and quite common for wireless transmissions.
Wyner’s wiretap channel setup fits eavesdropping scenario where the communication be-
tween the sender and the legitimate receiver can be seen as the main channel and the other
traffic to eavesdropper is seen as the wiretapper’s channel. Wynerand later Csisz´ar and
Körner prove that when the secrecy rate is below the secrecy capacity, there should exist
channel codes, which can guarantee both robustness to transmission errors to the legitimate
receiver and a prescribed degree of data confidentiality forthe eavesdropper. Hence the
wiretap channel setup can be applied in communications to achieve the security in physical
layer. A fundamental and well adopted wiretap channel modelis that the main channel is
noiseless and the eavesdroppers’ channel isbinary erasure channel(BEC). LDPC codes
have been applied to achieve secrecy capacity of such wiretap ch nnels. However, it lacks
design flexibility and cannot illustrate the fundamental trdeoffs among the secrecy rate,
erasure rate, and the secrecy performance. In this chapter,we present arandom complex
field code(RCFC) design for such wiretap channels. The design of RCFCsis systematic
and flexible for any code rate. Our analysis shows that RCFC can a hieve the secrecy ca-
pacity as the code length goes to infinity. More strikingly, the presented design is the first
one which provides a platform to tradeoff secrecy performance with the erasure rate of the
eavesdropper’s channel and the secrecy rate.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In Section5.1, we describe the wiretap
channel discussed in the chapter. The design of RCFC is presented in the following Section
5.2. Section5.3 describes the decoding strategies of Eve. In Section5.4, we analyze the
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security performance of RCFC and provide a way to design RCFCwith desired perfor-
mance. The decoding complexity for both Bob and Eve are studied in Section5.5. Section
5.6presents numerical results which verify the performance ofRCFC. Finally, Section5.7
concludes the chapter.
5.1 Wiretap Channel
In 1975, Wyner introduced another scenario of communication with information-theoretic
security [31]. In his seminal work, the wiretap channel is introduced, which is depicted
in Fig. 5.1. In a wiretap channel, Alice wants to transmit confidential messagess to the
legitimate receiver Bob through adiscrete memoryless channel(DMC) C1, whereas an
eavesdropper Eve may receive partially the transmitted message through another different
DMC C2. We call C1 as the main channel and C2 as the wiretapper’s channel. To secure
the messages, Alice encodesm-symbol messages into an-symbol codewordx and then
transmitsx. The observations at Bob and Eve are denoted byy and z, respectively. There
are two objectives to be achieved simultaneously by Alice’sencoder:reliability andsecu-
rity . More specifically, reliability requires that the legitimate receiver Bob should decode
s based on its observationy with negligible small error probability; while security requires
that Eve has no knowledge abouts via its own observationz when the codeword lengthn
goes to infinity, i.e.,1nI(s, z) → 0 asn → ∞. Wyner has shown that when C2 is a “de-
graded” version of C1 (either physically or statistically), Alice can securely transmit the
message at a positive ratem/n [31], which means both the reliable and secure communi-
cations can be achieved. The ratem/n is called the secrecy rate. The maximum value of
the possible secrecy rate is characterized by Wyner as the secr cy capacityCs [31]. Csiszár
and Körner extended the result to general wiretap channels[75]. More results on the se-
curity capacity of other broadcast channel scenarios can befound in [76–78]. To realize
the secure and reliable communication in a wiretap channel model, i.e., the security capac-
ity is strictly positive, the main channel must have some advantage over the wiretapper’s
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channel. But, more recently, Maurer proved that even the channel between Alice and Bob
is worse than the channel between Alice and Eve, it is still possible to generate a secret
key by public discussion [79]. However, in this chapter, since we do not allow interactive








Figure 5.1.Wiretap channel model.
Wyner and later Csisz´ar and Körner proved that when the secrecy rate is below the
secrecy capacity, there should exist a coding scheme to achieve both reliable and secure
transmission simultaneously [31,75]. Unfortunately, how to design the eff ctive codes for
a wiretap channel is still an open problem. So far, the most widely-adopted technique is
low-density parity-check (LDPC) codes proposed in [32,80,81]. It was shown in [32,82]
and [81] that LDPC codes can asymptotically approach the secrecy capacity.
In this chapter, we consider the same channel model as in [32] where the main channel
is noiseless and the wiretapper’s channel is BEC. We proposea non-binary design for such
a wiretap channel by using RCFC technique. The main idea forRCFC is to mix some
random symbols with the information symbols so that Eve can deco e them with extremely
low probability but Bob still can decode them correctly. The RCF codes are easy to design
with any given code rates. We show that when the erasure rate of BEC is greater than
zero, RCFC can achieve the secrecy capacity asymptotically. Moreover, when the secrecy
rates are below the secrecy capacity, RCFC can realize perfectly secure communication,
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i.e., both reliability and security can be achieved simultaneously. More important, not only
do we prove that RCFC is secrecy capacity-achieving codes, but also we can illustrate the
fundamental tradeoffs among the secrecy rate, erasure rate, and the lower bound ofthe
normalized security information rate, which is a metric of hw secure the coding scheme
is. Hence, the RCFC can be designed as required by the users orthe providers. However,
there are no such tradeoffs available for LDPC codes.
5.2 Random Complex Field Code
In this section, we describe the encoding scheme of RCF codes. As depicted in Fig.5.2,
there are two steps to encode the confidential messages. The first step is to form a code-
word matrixΓ. The second one is performinglinear complex field(LCF) symbol mixing.
In the first step, the codeword matrix is formed of three kindsof ymbols,i.e., the confi-
dential information symbols, the random symbolsup,q and the check symbols. Them× 1
confidential symbol vector contains complex symbolssp which are uniformly randomly
drawn from a QAM constellationS. The size of the constellationS is M. The random







Figure 5.2.LCF encoding scheme.
Them× n codeword matrixΓ is constructed as follows:
1) information symbolssp is put in thep-th row of Γ, but any column ofΓ with equal
probability;
2) random symbolup,q for p = 1, · · · ,m, q = 1, · · · , n− 2, is randomly drawn fromS and
placed at thepth row randomly;
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Figure 5.3.Elements ofΓ.





Figure5.3illustrates the structure of the codeword matrixΓ.
From the codeword matrix construction, we observe that every row of Γ contains one
information symbol,n − 2 random symbols, and one check symbol and it contains high
uncertainty due to the mixed random symbols and unknown placements. Note that the le-
gitimate receiver Bob does not know the random symbols and check symbols. To guarantee
that Bob can still decode the information symbols, we need thfollowing operation.
The codeword matrixΓ is further compressed into a vector by a linear CF encoder. The
encoding matrixθ is anm× 1 complex vector with well designed structure which ensures
that there is a one-to-one mapping betweenθT r and r if rp (the p-th element ofr) for
p = 1, · · · ,m is a QAM symbol. Here we adopt the first row of the linear precoding matrix
in [83, 84] as θT . In other words, once the value ofθT r is given, thenr can be uniquely
identified.
Example 2: when m= 2, according to the design criteria in [83,84], we have





8 . When 4-QAM constellation is used (S = {1+ j − 1+ j − 1− j 1− j}), the
one-to-one mapping table between the possibler andθT r is given in Table5.1.
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Table 5.1.Mapping table betweenr and θT r
r θT r
[−1+ j, − 1+ j]T − 2.3066+ 1.5412j
[−1+ j, − 1− j]T −1.5412− 0.3066j
[−1+ j, 1+ j]T −0.4588+ 2.3066j
[−1+ j, 1− j]T 0.3066+ 0.4588j
[−1− j, − 1+ j]T −2.3066− 0.4588j
[−1− j, − 1− j]T −1.5412− 2.3066j
[−1− j, 1+ j]T −0.4588+ 0.3066j
[−1− j, 1− j]T 0.3066− 1.5412j
[1 + j, − 1+ j]T −0.3066+ 1.5412j
[1 + j, − 1− j]T 0.4588− 0.3066j
[1 + j, 1+ j]T 1.5412+ 2.3066j
[1 − j, − 1− j]T 2.3066+ 0.4588j
[1 − j, − 1+ j]T −0.3066− 0.4588j
[1 − j, − 1− j]T 0.4588− 2.3066j
[1 − j, 1+ j]T 1.5412+ 0.3066j
[1 − j, 1− j]T 2.3066− 1.5412j
As shown in Table5.1, eachr corresponds to a uniqueθT r, vice versus.
After the matrixΓ is constructed andθ is designed, the confidential informations is
ready to be encoded by:
x = θTΓ, (5.3)
wherex is the transmitted symbol vector.
Here we consider a noiseless main channel and a BEC for eavesdropper with erasure
ratepe. Thus we have
y = x and z = [z1 z2 · · · zn] (5.4)
such thatzp = xp with probability pl = 1− pe andzp is erased, i.e.,zp =?, with probability
pe. pl is the leaked rate which describes the rate of information leaked to Eve.
In the following, we show that how Bob can perfectly recovers from y. To be general,
we assume Bob has complete knowledge ofθ but has no information about the random
symbols that are chosen to constructΓ. However, both Bob and Eve know that the random
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symbols are chosen from QAM alphabetS with uniform distribution.









wherexq andyq represent, respectively, theq-th element ofx andy. The first equation in
(5.5) holds from the noiseless main channel. while the second equation in (5.5) comes from
(5.1). Thanks to the check symbols, the random symbols are canceled out. Hence, Bob can
get the value ofθT s by summing up all the symbols iny. Since each symbol ofs is a QAM
symbol, Bob can easily find the exact confidential messages according to the one-to-one
mapping betweenθT s ands [83].
Result 1: Reliable transmission is achieved in noiseless main channel by RCF codes.
5.3 Decoding strategy of Eve
In this section, we provide the optimal decoding strategy ofEve. Without loss of generality
and reality, we have the following assumptions about Eve:
EA1) infinite computational power;
EA2) complete knowledge ofθ;
EA3) knowledge of the general rule to constructΓ;
EA4) no knowledge about the symbols that are chosen to constructΓ;
EA5) if there are some check symbolscp1, cp2 · · · cpµ are inγq (theq-th column ofΓ), Eve
can identify all the check symbols givenθT · γq.
EA2), EA3) and EA4) are the same to the knowledge of the legitimate receiver Bob. Notice
that γq may contain check symbolscp given by (5.1). By its definition,cp may or not
belong toS. For example, when 4-QAM symbols are employed, andn = 3, the check
symbolcp = −((−1 − j + (1 + j))) = 0, which is not in 4-QAM constellation. However,
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the coordinates ofcp are still some integers. Given the design ofθ, Eve can still get the
one-to-one mapping table betweenγq andθT · γq and thus identify the check symbolcp.
But there are also probabilities that the check symbolcp is still in S. For example,cp =
− ((1+ j) + (−1− j) + (1+ j)) = −1 − j, which is still in 4-QAM constellation. In such
case, whencp is one of the symbols inγq and Eve has decoded all symbols inγq, cp is
mixed with other symbols inγq, and thus Eve can not determine the check symbol. In
the following discussion, though it is not the true case, we assume Eve always has the
ability to determine the check symbol from other symbols when it is in γq. Based on these
assumptions about Eve, we first discuss the optimal decodingstrategy of Eve. Next, the
secure performance about RCFC based on the optimal decodingstrategy is analyzed.
Notice that when the elements in each row ofΓ have been generated, by permutating
the symbols in the same row, we can have differentΓ which still satisfy the construction
rules ofΓ. Hence the number of possibleΓ with these elements is (Pnn)
m, wherePkn is the
k-th falling factorial power ofn. Since all the permutations in each row ofΓ are considered
in the following discussions, we assume the first⌊n× pl⌉ symbols are leaked to Eve, which
means
z = [z1 z2 · · · zn] = [x1 x2 · · · xnpl ?· · ·?]. (5.6)













θTγq if q = 1, · · · , ⌊npl⌉
? if q = ⌊npl⌉ + 1, · · · , n
(5.7)
whereγq = [γ1,q γ2,q, · · · , γn,q]T . By the above assumption about Eve, all symbols in
γ1, γ2, · · · ,γnpl can be decoded by Eve.
Now we focus on how Eve should decodes1 based on the decoded symbols in the set
{γ1, γ2, · · · ,γnpl }. Since the symbols in different rows are independent to each other, only
the decoded symbols in the first row ofΓ may leak information abouts1 to Eve. Denote
the set of the decoded symbols of the first row ofΓ asD1. According to our assumptions,
we haveD1 = {γ1,1 γ1,2, · · ·γ1,npl }. Via the construction rules ofΓ, there are four possible
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combinations ofD1 which are listed as follows:
1. {γ1,1 γ1,2, · · ·γ1,npl } is only composed of random symbols{u1,1 u1,2, · · ·u1,npl }.
2. {γ1,1 γ1,2, · · ·γ1,npl } is composed of confidential symbols1 and random symbols.
3. {γ1,1 γ1,2, · · ·γ1,npl } is composed of check symbolc1 and random symbols.
4. {γ1,1 γ1,2, · · ·γ1,npl } is composed of confidential symbols1, check symbolc1 and ran-
dom symbols.
In the first two combinations, since the check symbolc1 is not decoded, Eve can not
know whethers1 is inD1 or not. For such combinations, the optimal decoding strategy for
Eve is randomly choosing one symbolγ1,q fromD1 ass1. When Eve adopts this decoding
strategy and the symbols inD1 are the first combination, the probability thats1 can be
decoded isP(s1 = γ1,q) = 1M . When it is the second combination,i.e., s1 ∈ D1, we have
P(s1 = γ1,q) = P(s1 = u1,∗|γ1,q = u1,∗)P(γ1,q = u1,∗) (5.8)











whereu1,∗ is any random symbol in the first row ofΓ. The last approximation in (5.8)
approachesP(s1 = γ1,q) closely with large code lengthn and fixed leaked ratepl.
For EA3) and EA4),c1 is known by Eve. The optimal decoding strategy for Eve is
given by two different cases:











If (5.9) holds, it means−c1 is the summation of the symbols inD1 \ c1 and some other
random symbolsue1, , ue2, · · ·uenpe. Thenpe − 1 random symbols in (5.9) are taken by Eve
as part of those erased symbols. Given by the definition ofc1, it is the summation of all the
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random symbols. Therefore,s1 is successfully mixed with other random symbols no matter
whethers1 is inD1 or not. Under such case, Eve can only randomly choose one symbol
fromD1 \ c1 ass1.
Case 2:If there are not such symbols that satisfy (5.9), then Eve knows thats1 must be in
D1. Eve can judge whetherγ1,k in D1 \ c1 is suspicious or not by checking whetherγ1,k










uel , ∀uel ∈ S, (5.10)
wherek = 1, 2 · · · , npl andγ1,k , c1. If the inequality (5.10) holds, thenγ1,k is suspected
ass1 by Eve. Sequentially checking each symbol inD1 \ c1, Eve can find out all suspicious
symbols. Denote the set of all the suspicious symbols asDs1. s1 is decoded by randomly
choosing one symbol fromDs1.
In summary, the optimal decoding strategy for Eve is presented as follows:
Step 1:Based on the observationz and the one-to-one mapping betweenθT · γq andγq,
Eve first decodesγ1, γ2 · · · , γnpl . The set of the decoded symbols in the first row ofΓ is
{γ1,1 γ1,2, · · ·γ1,npl }, which is denoted asD1.
Step 2:Judge whetherc1 is inD1 or not. If not, Eve just decodess1 by randomly choosing
one symbol fromD1. If c1 ∈ D1, Eve follows the methods inCase 1andCase 2to decode
s1.
Step 3: Decodes2, s3 · · · , sm by repeatingStep 2with the correspondingDp, for p =
2, 3 · · · ,m.
5.4 Security Analysis of RCF Codes
We have presented the decoding strategy of both Bob and Eve. Now let us analyze the
security performance of RCFC based on the proposed decodingstrategy. In this section,
unless specified, all the results are based on noiseless mainchan el and BEC for wiretapper.
The security performance of RCFC is analyzed from two aspect, i.e., the probability that
Eve can correctly decodes and the mutual information betweens andz.
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5.4.1 Decoding Ability of Eve
We have shown that ifc1 < D1, the probability thats1 is successfully decoded is1M . Now
we discuss the correct decoding probability whenc1 ∈ D1.
If D1 is composed ofc1 and random symbols, Eve will decodes1 via the methods in
Case 1andCase 2. Sinces1 < D1, thus (5.9) must hold. Eve can only randomly choose
one symbolγ1,p from D1 \ c1 as s1. Under such situation, the probability thats1 can be
successfully decoded by Eve isP(s1 = γ1,q) = 1M . If both s1, c1 are inD1, Eve will
choose one symbol from the suspicious setDs1 generated from the results ofCase 2. In
that case, the probability thats1 can be successfully decoded is 1/E
[|Ds1|
]
, whereE [·] is
the expectation and|Ds1| is the size ofDs1, i.e., the number of different symbols inDs1.









Summarizing all probabilities thats1 can be successfully decoded and (5.11), the following
lemma can be proved.
Lemma 5.4.1 For noiseless main channel and BEC for wiretapper, when RCFCs are em-




























in (5.12) depends on constellation size, the length of confidential
informationm, codeword lengthn and the erasure ratepe of the BEC. It is difficult (if not
impossible) to get the analytical expression ofE
[|Ds1|
]
. Here, the following lemma gives





Lemma 5.4.2 When cp ∈ Dp and sp ∈ Dp, given the QAM constellation size M, the













Now we are ready to present the upper bound of the probabilitythat Eve can successfully
decodes.
Theorem 5.4.3 Given the erasure rate of BEC pe, the probability that Eve can successfully
decode the confidential messages via his observationz is upper bounded by



























where Pkn is the k-th falling factorial power of n,̂s is the estimated confidential information








Now, two critical questions here are:
1. WhetherP(ŝ = s|z) converges with fixed erasure rate and secrecy rate whenn→ ∞?
2. If yes, what does it converge to?
To answer these two questions, we need the following lemma.
Lemma 5.4.4 Given the erasure rate of BEC pe and the secrecy rate m/n, if the secrecy
rate m/n is below or equal to the secrecy capacity (which is pe for the channel model






→ 1 as n→ ∞, (5.16)
where i= 1, · · · ,m.
Now we are ready to answer the above two questions by the following Corollary.
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Corollary 5.4.5 Given the erasure rate of the wiretap channel pe and the secrecy rate
m/n, when the secrecy rate is less than or equal to the secrecy capacity, i.e., m/n ≤ pe,
the probability that Eve can successfully decodes converges to the probability that Eve






The proof is straightforward from Lemma5.4.4.
So far, we derive an easily computed upper bound of the probability that Eve can suc-
cessfully decodes from z. We have also shown that with fixedpe and the secrecy ratem/n,
if we increase the codeword lengthn, Eve’s decoding ability is reduced. More extremely,
when the secrecy rate is less than or equal to the secrecy capacity of the wiretap channel, as
n→ ∞, RCF codes totally hide the confidential informations among all possible symbols
from the same QAM constellationS for Eve, i.e., the observation of Evez can not provide
any information abouts for Eve.
5.4.2 Achievable Security Information Rate of RCFC
In this section, we investigate the security performance ofRCF codes. Different from
binary coding scheme, RCF codes are non-binary codes. Hencewe d fine thenormalized
security information rateas follows (which is later shown to be a metric of how secure a
transmission is):
Definition 1: thenormalized security information rate RNS is defined as
RNS =
I(s; y) − I(s; z)
H(s) , (5.17)
whereI(s; y) represents the mutual information betweens andy andH(·) is the entropy.
By the definition of thenormalized security information rate, we have the following
property about it:
Lemma 5.4.6 Given noiseless main channel and BEC of wiretapper,0 ≤ RNS ≤ 1.
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By definition,RNS = 1 is equivalent toH(s|z) = H(s), which means
I(s; z) = H(s) −H(s|z) = 0, (5.18)
i.e., z can not provide any information abouts. If RNS = 0, then givenz, s can be decoded.
HenceRNS is a metric to measure how secure the transmission is. The larg r RNS is, the
more secures is. Therefore, in the following, we focus on analyzingRNS for RCFC over
the wiretap channel.
For noiseless main channel and binary erasure wiretapper’schannel, the following the-
orem gives a lower bound ofRNS that can be achieved by RCF codes.
Theorem 5.4.7 Given the secrete rate m/n and leak rate of BEC pl, the normalized security






















is the number of k combination of an m-set without repetition.
Theorem5.4.7reveals the fundamental relationship between the lower bound of RNS
achieved by RCF codes and the parameters of the channel and the codes. According to the
results given in Theorem5.4.7, it is easy to estimate the performance the RCF codes given
pe, code ratemn and the QAM constellationS. But the true transmission should be more
secure than the estimation given in Theorem5.4.7. On the other side, given the desiredR′NS
andpe, Theorem5.4.7offers a way to design the RCF codes which is described as follows:
1. Initilize m, n andS;
2. Compute the lower bound ofRNS given in Theorem5.4.7with chosenm, n andS;
3. If the lower bound ofRNS is larger than or equal toR′NS, then the chosenm, n andS
should satisfy the requirement; If not, adjust some or all ofthe parameters and start
over from step 2.
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Next, we show that RCF codes can achieve the secrecy capacityasymptotically.
Corollary 5.4.8 Given the erasure rate of the wiretapper’s binary erasure channel pe and
the secrecy ratemn of RCF codes, when m/n ≤ pe, RNS → 1 as n→ ∞, i.e., the RCF codes
can achieve the secrecy capacity as the codeword length n goes to infinity.
In this section, we have shown that when the secrecy rate is less than or equal to the
channel erasure rate, Eve can only blindly choose the information symbols asn→ ∞. In
other words, RCF codes can achieve the secrecy capacity.
5.5 The Analysis of the Computation Complexity
In this section, we compare the computation complexity for Bb and Eve. From the de-
coding strategies of Bob and Eve, both of them need to construct a look-up table between
a m× 1 column vectorr and the value ofθT · r. We focus on the size of the two different
look-up tables that Bob and Eve needs to construct. Actually, even with existing look-up
tables, the strategies for Bob and Eve have shown that the operations in Eve’s decoding are
far more complex than Bob’s. However, those operations in the decoding steps are not the
concern here.
Let us first consider the look-up table for Bob. As shown in (5.5), after summing all the
symbols in Bob’s observationy, he gets the valueθT · s. Hence Bob only need to construct
a look-up table showing the relationship betweens andθT · s. When the size of QAM
constellation isM and there arem confidential symbols ins, the number of the possible
values ofθT · s is Mm, thus the size of the table for Bob isMm.
Different from Bob, Eve can only get{θT · γ1, · · · , θT · γnpl }. The possible symbols
in γq include the information symbols, the random symbols and thecheck symbols. By
the definition of the check symbol given in (5.1), there areMn−2 possible check symbols
(Since there may be some repetitions, the actual number of possible check symbols should
be less thanMn−2. However, since the decoding strategy of Eve requires to findout all the
possible combinations of random symbols that generate the same check symbol, we take
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those check symbols with the same value as different ones). Hence the size of the look-up





Table5.2 shows the size of the look-up tables for Eve and Bob and the ratio be ween
them. From Table5.2we can see that the difference in the size is quite impressive. It is also
shown in this table that the length of the codeword will not change the size of the look-up
table for Bob but it hugely increases the one for Eve. Furthermore, if we increasem andn
simultaneously to keep the code ratemn unchanged, the size for Bob is increased byM
m, but
the size for Eve is increased byMm×(n−1). Therefore, increasing the length of the codeword
is an effective way to increase the decoding complexity for Eve.
Table 5.2.The size of the look-up tables for Bob and Eve
The parameters Bob Eve Eve/Bob
M = 4, m= 5, n = 10 1024 > 445 > 440
M = 8, m= 10, n = 20 810 > 8190 > 8180
M = 16, m= 10, n = 20 1610 > 16190 > 16180
M = 8, m= 10, n = 30 810 > 8290 > 8280
M = 8, m= 15, n = 30 815 > 8435 > 8420
5.6 Numerical Results
The performance of the proposed RCF codes is evaluated by estimating the upper bound
of the probability that Eve can successfully decode the confide tial informations and the
lower bound of the normalized security information rate achieved by RCF codes. The
numerical results are presented by different example studies.
Example 3: GivenM = 16and m= 10, Fig.5.4depicts the upper bounds of the probabili-
ties given in (5.14) that Eve can successfully decode the confidential information s via his
observationz with different codeword lengthn.
We observe that with the same erasure ratepe, the largern is, the smaller the upper
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Figure 5.4.The upper bound of P(ŝ = s|z) from Theorem 5.4.3 for QAM constellation with different
code lengthn. M = 16, m= 10.
bound ofP(ŝ = s|z) is. Hence increasingn reduces the probability thats can be success-
fully decoded by Eve. But as shown in Fig.5.4, whenm/n > pe, the upper bound of
P(ŝ = s|z) can not approach (1M )m (In this example,log10(
1
M )
m ≈ −12). However when
m/n ≤ pe, P(ŝ = s|z) approaches (1M )m, asymptotically. The curves match well with the
result in Corollary 1. Actually,P(ŝ = s|z) = ( 1M )m means Eve can not get any information
abouts from his observation and can just randomly pickm symbols fromS ass. Fig. 5.4
shows that the proposed RCF codes can decrease the decoding probability of Eve by in-
creasing the codeword lengthn. When the secrecy ratem/n is below or equal to the secrecy
capacity of the wiretap channel, which ispe in this example, the decoding probability of
Eve approaches (1M )
m asn goes to infinity.
Example 4: Givenn = 100and m= 10, Fig.5.5 plots the upper bounds of the probabil-
ities that Eve can successfully decode the informations with different sizes of the QAM
constellationsM.
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Figure 5.5.The upper bound of P(ŝ = s|z) from Theorem 5.4.3 for QAM constellation with different
QAM constellation sizeM. n = 100, m= 10.
In this case, the largerM is, the smaller the upper bound ofP(ŝ = s|z) is, which means
increasing the size of the constellation can reduce the probability thats can be successfully
decoded by Eve. But, increasingM will also increase decoding complexity for both Bob
and Eve. Hence it may not be the practical method to realize the secure transmission.
Example 5: Given m = 10, Fig.5.6 plots the lower bounds of the normalized security
information rateRNS achieved by RCF codes with different length of the codewordn and
different constellation sizesM.
The results in Fig.5.6 are from Theorem5.4.7. With fixed pe, the largern induces
thatRNS approaches 1 faster. Hence, increasing the length of RCF codes can improve the
security of the transmission over wiretapper’s channel. InExample 3, we have shown that
largerM brings smaller upper bound of the probability thats can be successfully decoded
by Eve. But the situation is different forRNS. As shown in Fig.5.6, with the samepe, the
largerM is, the smaller the lower bound ofRNS is. Therefore, givenpe and the code rate
of RCF codes, to simultaneously achieve low decoding ability of Eve and highRNS of the
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M = 8, n = 40
M = 8, n = 70
M = 8, n = 100
M = 16, n = 100
M = 32, n = 100
M = 64, n = 100
Figure 5.6.The lower bound of RNS from Theorem 5.4.7 with different length of the codewordn and
different constellation sizeM.
channel, increasing the length of RCF codes is the effective way.
These numerical results have verified both Theorems5.4.3 and 5.4.7. Also they il-
lustrate the flexibility of our design with different secrecy rate. With the constraint of
m/n ≤ pe, as the codeword length goes to infinity, the normalized security information rate
reaches the optimal value 1.
5.7 Conclusion and Future Directions
In this chapter, we present RCFC to achieve the security overwir tap channel with noise-
less main channel and binary erasure wiretap’s channel. It has been shown that RCF codes
are easy and flexible to design with any given secrecy rates. Walso prove that RCF codes
can achieve the secrecy capacity asymptotically with the codew rd length goes to infinity.
Moreover, when the secrecy rate is below the secrecy capacity, secure communication can
be realized by RCFC. Furthermore, the proposed design is thefirst one which provides a
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platform to tradeoff secrecy performance with the erasure rate of the eavesdropper’s chan-
nel and the secrecy rate.
However, the performance of RCFCs for noisy channel is stillan open problem. When
RCFCs are applied for wireless communications, more work needs to be studied for fading




In this dissertation, we have studied signal detection and security code design from
information theoretic point of view. The main contributions are summarized as follows.
we have developed a computationally efficient sub-optimal detection algorithm and
coding scheme for 2-D ISI channel with M-ary inputs by using multilevel coding and mul-
tistage decoding. The fundamental idea is to equalize the channel stage by stage. To begin
with the stage with the highest signal power level, the multi-strip BCJR algorithm is used to
equalize each level by averaging the interference of the undcoded levels. Both the hard and
soft decisions are passed to the next stages. To reduce the computation complexity, instead
of using full-branch BCJR on the entire received page of data, the BCJR algorithm is only
employed on reduced states by considering the bits from the und tected levels as indepen-
dently and identically distributed with equal probability. Furthermore, the distribution of
the output given the data of the detected levels is approximated by a Gaussian distribution.
Both the mean and the variance of the approximated distribution can be computed offline.
Using the approximation, the data on the current stage can bedecoded without considering
the data from undetected levels. Hence the number of states at each stage is kept at 2Lx×Ly.
With the proposed detection scheme, we also compute the achivable information rate on
each level. More over, the corresponding component LDPC code is esigned accordingly
to achieve the achievable information rate with the proposed d tection algorithm. Both
numerical and simulation results have demonstrated the significant performance of the pro-
posed detection algorithm in detecting signals through M-ary 2D ISI channels.
For the discrete MIMO channel with MLD or ZFD, we first established a new met-
ric, the post-detection mutual information (PMI), to quantify he ultimate information rate
between the discrete inputs and the hard detected output. This is t e first time that the infor-
mation rate loss caused by the hard mapping of the detectors is considered. Since the hard
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mapping step in the detector is irreversible, we expect thatthe PMI is reduced compared to
the MI without hard mapping. The conclusion is confirmed by both the simulation and the
theoretic results. Consequently, the ultimate achievablePMI rates that can be transmitted
through the MIMO channels with MLD or ZFD serve as more practical benchmarks for
transmissions. Next, we derive the analytical expression of the PMI with MLD or ZFD.
We have shown that there is no closed form formula of for the PMI. However, the easily
computed asymptotically lower bounds of them are proposed for PSK constellations. The
lower bounds also serve as the approximations. Moreover, when QAM constellations are
adopted, we provide the numerical form for the PMI with ZFD. The values obtained from
the numerical formula match exactly the results from the simulations. We have also shown
that whenod(H) = 0, the PMI with MLD or ZFD is equal to each other which is consistent
with the case for the MI with ML and ZF receiver. All of the research results about the PMI
have been verified by the simulation results.
To achieve the secure transmission over wiretap channel with noiseless main channel
and BEC wiretapper’s channel, we have proposed a non-binarysecurity code design by
using random complex field coding (RCFC) technique. The key id a for RCFC is to mix
some random symbols with the information symbols so that Evecannot decode information
symbols but Bob still can. The RCF codes are easy to design with any given code rates.
We have shown that when the erasure rate of BEC is greater thanzero, RCFC can achieve
the secrecy capacity asymptotically. Moreover, when the secrecy rates are below the se-
crecy capacity, RCFC can realize perfectly secrete communication,i.e., both reliability and
security can be achieved simultaneously. We have also demonstrated that the decoding for
Bob is extremely easy, which is just checking a look-up table. However, Eves’ computation
complexity is rapidly and hugely increased with the codeword length. Even though Eve did
a very complex computation, as long as the secrecy rates are below the secrecy capacity, we
can design a RCFC such that the decoding of Eve is just blindlyguessing the information
symbols from the transmission constellation. More importantly, in addition to approaching
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the secrecy capacity, the proposed code design is the first one which provides a platform
to tradeoff secrecy performance with the erasure rate of the eavesdropper’s channel and the
secrecy rate. Hence, the RCFC can be designed as required by the users or the providers.
While, there are no such tradeoffs available for LDPC codes. The significant performance
of RCFC has been confirmed by both the numerical and simulation results.
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APPENDIX A
PROOF FOR CHAPTER 3
A.1 Proof of Proposition 3.3.1
In this appendix, we show how to derive Proposition3.3.1. According to central lim-
ited theorem,P
(
y(i, j)|d̂(k+1:K)(i − Ly : i, j − Lx, j), d(k)(i − Ly : i, j − Lx, j)
)
can be approx-
imated by a Normal distribution. The mean of the approximated Normal distribution is
the expectation value ofy(i, j) given d̂(k+1:k)(i − Ly : i, j − Lx : j), d(k)(i − Ly : i, j − Lx :







y(i, j)|d̂(k+1:k)(i − Ly : i, j − Lx : j), d(k)(i − Ly : i, j − Lx : j), d̃(1:k−1)(i − Ly : i, j − Lx : j)
]



















h(p, q)x(1:k−1)(i − p, j − q).
(A.1)
In (A.1), the first term on the right-hand side can be calculated by












































































































Plug (A.2), (A.3), and (A.4) in (A.1), (3.17) can be derived.




















































d̂(k+1:k)(i − Ly : i, j − Lx : j),
d(k)(i − Ly : i, j − Lx : j),









































PROOF FOR CHAPTER 4
B.1 Proof of Proposition4.2.1
From the definition of PMI with MLD given in Definition4.1.1, we have
I(s; ŝML|H)
= H(s) − H(s|ŝML,H)


































































P(ŝML = sv|s = su,H)
∑
sp∈SM
P(ŝML = sv|s̃ = sp,H)
log2
P(ŝML = sv|s = su,H)
∑
sp∈SM










































P(ŝML = sv|s = su,H) log2
P(ŝML = sv|s = su,H)
∑
sp∈SM




















When PSK symbols are transmitted, since the noise is signal-ndependent and the PSK
symbols are equivalent to each other, we have




P(ŝML = sv|s̃ = sp,H) =
∑
sp∈SM
P(ŝML = sp|s̃ = sv,H) = 1. (B.3)
By plugging (B.3) into (B.1) and exchanging the summation order, (4.8) is proved.
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B.2 Proof of Lemma4.2.2
Given the model in (2.3), when the transmitted vectors = su, we have
P
(






















−1η + ηHW−1euv ≤ −‖euv‖2W−1
)
(B.4)
whereeuv = su− sv. Sinceη is complex Gaussian distributed with zero mean and covariance
matrix W, the random variableHuvW
−1η + ηHW−1euv is also complex Gaussian with the





















−1η+ηHW−1euv is Gaussian distributed with zero mean and variance 2eHuvW
−1euv.
Back to (B.4), we have (4.12) which is the conclusion of lemma4.2.2.
B.3 Proof of Lemma4.2.3
DenoteD(v, k|u) = ‖x − sv‖2W−1 − ‖x − sk‖
2
W−1
provided thats = su. SubstitutingD(v, k|u) in
(4.9), the error probability is
P(ŝML = sv|s = su, u , v,H)
= P (D(v, k|u) ≤ 0, ∀k)





· P (D(v, k|u) ≤ 0|D(v, u|u) ≤ 0,∀k , v andk , u) , (B.7)
where the final step is obtained via (4.12) presented in lemma4.2.2. Since the second term
in (B.7) is less than or equal to 1, the conclusion of lemma4.2.3holds.
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B.4 Proof of Theorem4.2.5
In this appendix, we show how to derive the lower bound of PMI with MLD for PSK
symbols. When PSK symbols are employed, the PMI with MLD is given by (4.8):
I(s; ŝML|H)








P(ŝML = sv|s = su,H) · log2 P(ŝML = sv|s = su,H)
)





H(ŝML|s = su), (B.8)
where




P(ŝML = sv|s = su,H) · log2 P(ŝML = sv|s = su,H)
)
. (B.9)
Notice thatH(ŝML|s = su) is an entropy function which achieves its maximum value if
and only if P(ŝML = sv|s = su,H) = 1|S|M for any sv ∈ SM. Furthermore, according to
the characteristics of the entropy function, the more uniform P(ŝML = sv|s = su,H) is, the
largerH(ŝML|s = su) is. We prove the conclusion of Theorem4.2.5in the following three
steps.






≤ 1|S|M , wherel1(·) represents any index in the set{l1(1), l1(2), · · · }.
Via the claims in Lemma4.2.3and Lemma4.2.4, we have




≤ 1|S|M , and (B.10)






















to replace the true correct detection probability to estimateH(ŝML|s =
su). We denote the estimated one asĤ(ŝML|s = su). Notice that the difference between the
replaced error and correct detection probabilities is smaller than the true difference between
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them, but the error probabilities and the correct detectionprobability are still on the two
sides of 1|S|M . From the characteristics of the entropy function, we have
Ĥ(ŝML|s = su) > H(ŝML|s = su). (B.12)
Eq.(B.12) shows that if we use the upper bound of the error probabilities for the signals in
SM1 to replace the real values of them and use the lower bound of the correction detection
probability to replace the true value, then the estimatedĤ(ŝML|s = su) is larger than the
true value. This conclusion is consistent with the claim in theorem 1. Therefore, in the
following we do not need to consider the signals inSM1 , we focus on the symbols which are
not inSM1 .
Step 2: denote
H1(ŝML|s = su) (B.13)




P(ŝML = sv|s = su,H) · log2 P(ŝML = sv|s = su,H)
)
.
From the definition ofH1(ŝML|s = su), we can conclude thatH1(ŝML|s = su) is still an
entropy-like function but with the sum of the probabilities1 −
∑
sv∈SM1
P(ŝML = sv|s = su,H)
instead of 1. Similar to the entropy function,H1(ŝML|s = su) achieves its maximum value
when




P(ŝML = sv|s = su,H)
|SM \ SM1 |
. (B.14)
LetSM2 = {sl2(1), sl2(2), · · · } ⊆ SM \ {SM1
































. Similar to Step 1, we have
Ĥ1(ŝML|s = su) ≥ H1(ŝML|s = su), (B.15)
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H2(ŝML|s = su) (B.17)




P(ŝML = sv|s = su,H) · log2 P(ŝML = sv|s = su,H)
)
.
Step 3: repeat Step 1 and Step 2 until all the symbols inSM \{su} are partitioned in different
subsetsSMp .
Summarizing the results from Step 1 to 3, we have shown that any increase in the error
probabilities and the corresponding decrease in the correct detection probability induce the
increase ofH(ŝML|s = su). Combining the conclusion with (B.8), theorem4.2.5is proved.
B.5 Proof of Lemma4.3.2
First we assume ˆsZF = sv. From (4.5) we have
‖xm− sv,m‖2 ≤ ‖xm− sk,m‖2 (B.18)
for m= 1, · · · ,M and∀k , v. It is straight forward to obtain










= (x − sk)†Λ(x − sk), (B.19)
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for ∀k , v. On the other hand, let
sv = arg
s̃∈SM
min(x − s̃)†Λ(x − s̃). (B.20)
If there existssk,n ∈ S andsk,n , sv,n such that‖xn − sk,n‖2 < ‖xn − sv,n‖2, then there should
















sk,m = sk,n if m= n
sk,m = sv,m if m, n andm= 1, · · · ,M.
(B.21)
Hence we have










= Λn,n(‖xn − sv,n‖2 − ‖xn − sk,n‖2) > 0. (B.22)
This is contradicted with (B.20). Therefore there is no suchsk,n. Hence lemma4.3.2 is
proved.
B.6 Proof of Lemma4.3.6
According to (2.3) and (4.3), we have
x = s + H†ω
= [Re(s) + iIm(s)] + [Re(H†) + iIm(H†)][Re(ω) + iIm(ω)]
= [Re(s) + ARe(ω) − BIm(ω)] + i [Im(s) + AIm(ω) + BRe(ω)] (B.23)
























































































































































From (B.24), the covariance matrix ofz is given by



















































































































































































































































































Combining (B.26) with (B.25) proves the claim in lemma4.3.6.
B.7 Proof of Theorem4.4.1
If od(H) = 0, thenH is an orthogonal matrix. Therefore, the covariance matrix of the
equalized vectorW given in (4.4) is a diagonal matrix. According to (4.9) and (4.32), when
we chooseΛ =W, we have
P{ŝZF = sv|s = su, u , v,H} = P{ ˆsML = sv|s = su, u , v,H} (B.27)
whereŝ is the detected vector with MLD. Substituting (B.27) into (4.8) and (4.30) gives us
the result of theorem4.4.1.
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APPENDIX C
PROOF FOR CHAPTER 5
C.1 Proof of Lemma5.4.2







Let us considerDs1 first. Notice that whens1 ∈ D1, there still may be some erased random
symbols in the first row ofΓ that are equal tos1. Under such situation, (5.9) must hold.
Thuss1 is successfully mixed with other random symbols. Hence the size ofDs1 is M for


























Combining (C.2) and (5.11), Lemma5.4.2is proved.
C.2 Proof of Lemma5.4.3
First, let us compute the probability that Eve can successfully decodes1, which is


































The last inequality in (C.3) is derived from (5.13).
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The probability that Eve can successfully decode each symbol of s is independent of
each other, thus we have




























































C.3 Proof of Lemma5.4.4


































as n → ∞, thus
[
1− (1− 1M )npe
]npe → 1. Since both the lower and the upper bounds






→ 1 asn→ ∞, (C.8)
for i = 1, · · · ,m.
C.4 Proof of Theorem5.4.7
Suppose there arem− k rows ofΓ in which both the confidential symbolssp and the check
symbolscp are in the firstnpl symbols,i.e.,Eve will apply the second step of the decoding
strategy to decode them− k symbols ins. Denote the set of the observations of Evez′s
that are generated by suchΓ asQk. When the observation of Evez ∈ Qk, the number of
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the possiblem− k confidential symbols that can generate suchz is equal to(E [|Ds1|
])m−k.
Except for them−k rows, there should bek rows ofΓ in which the confidential symbol and
the check symbol are not both in the firstnpl symbols. Denote the set of the observations
of Eve z′s that are generated by suchΓ asRk. According to (5.12), when the observation
of Eve z ∈ Rk, the number of the possiblek confidential symbols that can generate suchz
is equal toMk. Hence we have:
H(s|z ∈ Qk ∩ Rk)
= P(z ∈ Qk ∩ Rk) · log2
(


























































































· log2(Mk · Am−k). (C.11)
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C.5 Proof of Corollary 5.4.8
With fixed pe, whenm/n ≤ pe andn→ ∞, via (5.15), A→ M. From (C.11) and the result


























































By the definition of the normalized security information rate, RNS should be less than or
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